\u3ci\u3eGraham\u27s \u3c/i\u3eGatekeeper and Beyond:  Juvenile Sentencing and Release Reform in the Wake of \u3ci\u3eGraham\u3c/i\u3e and \u3ci\u3eMiller\u3c/i\u3e by Annitto, Megan
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 80 | Issue 1 Article 3
Fall 2014
Graham'sGatekeeper and Beyond: Juvenile
Sentencing and Release Reform in the Wake of
Graham andMiller
Megan Annitto
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation




Graham’s Gatekeeper and Beyond
JUVENILE SENTENCING AND RELEASE REFORM IN
THE WAKE OF GRAHAM ANDMILLER
Megan Annitto†
INTRODUCTION
The justice system has always struggled with its
approach to children who commit violent crimes or who are
repeat offenders.1 Beginning at the end of the twentieth century,
state policies pulled more and more juveniles into the criminal
justice system through stricter juvenile transfer laws.2 States
are now compelled to address the results of these policy
decisions as they have come up against their limit, the Eighth
Amendment, under Florida v. Graham3 and Miller v. Alabama.4
Because of juveniles’ capacity for change, under Graham, states
and the federal government must provide a “meaningful
opportunity” for release to juveniles sentenced to life if they have
not committed murder.5 And, under Miller, states must allow a
† Assistant Professor of Law, Charlotte School of Law. I am grateful for the
comments that I received presenting this article at the Northeastern University Law
School Legal Scholarship Conference of 2014. Thank you to Tamar Birckhead, Kate
Crowley, Andrew Ferguson, Daniel Filler, Richard Leo, Daniel Medwed, Kelly Mitchell,
and Saira Mohamed for their helpful comments. I am also appreciative to Elizabeth
Calvin and James Dold for their insights. The article also benefited from discussions at
the National Juvenile Defender Center Leadership Summit in 2013. Finally, I received
excellent research assistance from Kendall Bourdon and Alicia Shankle.
1 Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative
Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 471, 487 (1987).
2 Between 1992 and 1995, forty-one states enacted provisions increasing the
ability to transfer juveniles to adult court. MELISSA SICKMUND, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 1, 30 (1997), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/juvoff.pdf. In 1985, 7200 juveniles were tried as adults.
By 1994, the number had doubled and that year, 13,200 juveniles were tried as adults,
contributing to the increase in life sentenced juveniles. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON, THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN
AMERICA 12 (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
inc_Life%20Goes%20On%202013.pdf [hereinafter THE SENTENCING PROJECT].
3 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
4 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
5 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
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judge to consider that possibility before issuing a life sentence to
a juvenile who has committed homicide.6 Therefore, Miller
requires that state sentencing schemes include an alternative
sentence, theMiller alternative.
The rationale in both Graham and Miller may be a
springboard to reform for all juvenile offenders who are subject
to lengthy adult sentences for crimes.7 Furthermore, the Court’s
reasoning supports providing opportunities for reconsideration
about procedures for adult offenders; currently, one out of nine
inmates in the United States is currently serving a life sentence.8
In the meantime, as a result of Graham and Miller, lawmakers
and courts must decide how and when to release juveniles who
are tried and sentenced under adult sentencing schemes for
serious offenses.9 Specifically, when release mechanisms are
provided at some point down the road after sentencing, who
should decide if they should be released? And in what way will
age at the time of the offense combine with other factors as
Graham andMiller contemplate?
This Article analyzes how states and the federal
government should assign the decision-making function as they
craft sentencing and offender release policies in light of
Graham and Miller. Specifically, it focuses on the implications
of choosing judicial or administrative parole decision makers as
the gatekeepers of release at the back end of sentencing. It also
examines the parallel role of modern risk assessment
technology as states look to make informed policy choices.
Actuarial risk assessment promises to have an impact on
juvenile offenders in the adult system; for example, three of the
states that house the highest numbers of juveniles serving life
sentences are required by state law to use these tools in their
parole release decisions.10
The ways that states and the federal government are
required to amend laws that mete out life sentences to juveniles
6 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469
7 See, e.g., State v. Lyle, No. 11-1339, 2014 WL 3537026, at *22-23 (Iowa
July 18, 2014) (prohibiting the application of mandatory minimum adult sentencing
statutes to juveniles under the state constitution).
8 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 2, at 1; see also Michael M.
O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1247, 1249 (2011) (noting how “Graham may presage a broader recognition of a
constitutional right to earned release from long prison terms in the United States”).
9 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. “It is for the State . . . to explore the means and
mechanism for compliance” with providing a “meaningful opportunity to obtain
release.” Id.
10 See infra notes 271-73 and accompanying test discussing California,
Louisiana, and Michigan’s related laws.
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in response to Graham and Miller differ depending upon whether
or not the juvenile is convicted of a homicide offense. But both
decisions are grounded in the principle that juveniles are less
culpable for their illegal conduct and have a greater potential to
change and rehabilitate as they develop into adults.11 Graham
requires that states provide juvenile offenders with a meaningful
opportunity for “release based [up]on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation” if a life sentence is imposed for a non-homicide
offense.12 And underMiller, life without parole cannot be imposed
as a mandatory sentence on a juvenile.13 As a result, the
legislature must provide the judge with another sentencing
option. Access to parole initially appeared to be the most obvious
pathway to review under Graham14 and the most likely
alternative sentencing option under Miller. But nearly half the
states and the federal government have largely dismantled or
strictly limited the use of discretionary parole.15 Thus, in some
states, new legislation has designated a process whereby the
judiciary will fill Graham’s gatekeeping role through sentencing
review procedures. Similarly, the opportunity to apply for future
sentencing modification before a judge will provide the necessary
alternative to comply with Miller in lieu of parole. Legislators
may also choose to create a new method. The Court left the
decision open to states and the federal government without
dictating the substance or procedure for how this important
gatekeeping role should function.
As a result, states have just begun experimenting and
legislatures and courts across the country have taken up
juvenile sentencing reform. Some courts and legislatures have
already extended reform beyond the minimum requirements of
Graham and Miller, abolishing juvenile life without parole
sentences entirely16 or, in one state, even striking down
11 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460, 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74-75, 77.
12 Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
13 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
14 See Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1745, 1747 (2012) (describing parole as “the distinguishing factor in Graham between a
constitutional and unconstitutional life sentence”); see also O’Hear, supra note 8, at
1248-49 (mentioning Graham’s role in the “comeback” of parole).
15 Edward E. Rhine, The Present Status and Future Prospects of Parole
Boards, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 627, 632 (Joan
Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz, eds. 2012). Only 24 states have parole boards that operate
with nearly complete discretionary review for release. Id.
16 See, e.g., Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 284
(Mass. 2013). “Simply put, because the brain of a juvenile is not fully developed, either
structurally or functionally, by the age of eighteen, a judge cannot find with confidence that
a particular offender, at that point in time, is irretrievably depraved. Therefore, it follows
that the judge cannot ascertain, with any reasonable degree of certainty, whether
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mandatory minimum adult sentencing schemes as applied to
juveniles.17 But early implementation also demonstrates that
without a change in the overarching debate, the more popular
tendency may be to choose policies that test the bare minimum
of the Court’s requirements. Concerns over public safety are, of
course, appropriately at the forefront of this conversation. But
some of the opposition to release reform is at odds with
research that lengthy sentences do not increase public safety.18
How then to best mediate between the classic retributive
principles that drive carceral policies more broadly,19 with the
notion undergirding Graham and Miller that juvenile offenders
are more capable of change and less morally culpable than
adults for their criminal acts?20 It is unclear whether the public
cares about or agrees with these principles about juvenile
offenders who commit serious crimes. After all, public
sentiment swayed the dramatic policy shift during the 1990s
that allowed for more juveniles to be tried as adults, subjecting
them to adult sentences.21 The now infamous myth of the
violent juvenile “super predator” gave rise to nationwide
legislative decisions to sentence juveniles in adult courts in with
rapid uniformity.22 Quite simply, that is how we got here, at least
imposition of this most severe punishment is warranted.” Id. (internal citation omitted);
Order Requiring Immediate Compliance with Miller, Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568 (E.D.
Mich. Nov. 26, 2013), available at http://www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/file/
HillOrderRequiringParoleProcess.pdf, appeal filed Dec. 5, 2013 (requiring review for all
juvenile offenders serving life without parole sentences after ten years).
17 State v. Lyle, No. 11-1339, 2014 WL 3537026, at *23 (Iowa July 18, 2014).
18 David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 27, 29-30 (2011).
19 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that during the
1980s after the failures of rehabilitation programs, the corrections system came to be
accepted as a retributive tool).
20 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (discussing diminished
moral culpability of juvenile offenders and opportunity for reform); Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (noting “a juvenile non-homicide offender’s capacity for change
and limited moral culpability”).
21 Franklin E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from an
Ideological Battleground, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (1999).
22 Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking,
69 MD. L. REV. 849, 908 (2010); Zimring, supra note 21, at 260; see, e.g., Kate Abbey-
Lambertz & Ashley Woods, Michigan Juvenile Life Without Parole Mandatory Sentencing
Ban Upheld By Judge, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2013, 4:15 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/14/michigan-juvenile-life-without-parole-sentencing
_n_3756853.html. Detroit Democratic Representative Leland, once in support of juvenile
life sentences, stated, “We wanted to let thugs know that they can’t hide behind their
mother’s apron . . . . Now, 25 years later, I think locking youthful offenders up for life is
ridiculous.” Abbey-Lambertz & Woods, supra note 22 (quoting Leland on his change in
position over the years).
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in part; as more children were tried in adult courts, more received
lengthy adult sentences, mandatory or otherwise.23
And it is public sentiment that contributed to the near
abolition of parole for some states and the federal government,
its curtailment in others, and mandatory minimum sentencing.24
The point is that historically, public opinion matters in the
debate about offender release because it influences decision
makers at the micro and macro levels.25 Policies that consider
release of offenders are fraught with controversy, even where
some changes are required by the Court under Graham and
Miller.26 New policies in this area involve consideration of
juveniles whose crimes often involve serious violence. Therefore,
responses to Graham and Miller must balance public safety
while recognizing the possibility of rehabilitation of young
offenders as the Supreme Court requires.
This Article focuses primarily on the gatekeeping
function of juvenile offender release laws. It primarily
considers sentencing reform that addresses back end release
decisions prompted by Graham and Miller. Part I provides a
brief background on Graham and Miller and discusses the
context and prevalence of juveniles serving life and lengthy
adult sentences. It then outlines some of the existing court and
legislative responses to date and compares their use of both
administrative and judicial routes to compliance. Part II
discusses the practical considerations that accompany both
judicial and administrative options for assignment of the
decision-making function in the context of juvenile release
reform. Part III examines the way in which the use of risk
assessment instruments interacts with the unique aspects of
23 Zimring, supra note 21, at 260.
24 JOAN PETERSILIA, REFORMING PROBATION AND PAROLE: IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 111 (2002).
25 See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L.
REV. 415, 443 (2012) (noting fear of political backlash based upon the public’s response to
parole of certain offenders and its role in reducing the utilization of early release policies).
26 See, e.g., Jonathan Oosting, Schuette Appealing Federal Order on Juvenile
Lifer Parole: ‘A Victim Was Already Sentenced to Death’, MLIVE (Dec. 2, 2013, 12:56 PM),
http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/12/schuette_to_appeal_order_on_ju.html
(describing how Michigan Attorney General, Bill Schuette, “has fought against re-
sentencing or parole hearings for juvenile lifers, and plans to continue to do so by filing
an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit”); see also Jonathan Simon,
Mass Incarceration: From Social Policy to Social Problem, in THE OXFORDHANDBOOK OF
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra note 15, at 23, 25 (noting that the “forms of
identity and routine action that have been framed around the problem of violent
crime . . . [are] easily mobilized to check efforts at reform”). For examples of resistance
surrounding the release of dying and elderly prisoners with lower level crimes, see
Klingele, supra note 25, at 437; Jesse J. Norris, The Earned Release Revolution: Early
Assessments and State-Level Strategies, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1551, 1592 (2012).
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young offenders with serious criminal convictions. Part IV
suggests that reform responses to Graham and Miller should
carefully consider the assignment of the decision-making role. In
doing so, responses should be cognizant the potential strengths
and weaknesses associated with either avenue. If sentencing
and release reform is implemented in the spirit of the decisions,
Graham andMiller can be used as a catalyst and an opportunity
to pioneer changes that reconsider current sentencing and
parole practices more broadly while maintaining public safety
and increasing the legitimacy of the process.
I. GRAHAM ANDMILLER
A. Life Sentences and Juveniles
Terrance Graham was sixteen when he committed a
burglary and attempted armed robbery and he was seventeen
when he later violated his probation and received a life
sentence.27 Because Florida has abolished its parole system, his
life sentence provided no opportunity for parole.28
Subsequently, in Graham, the Supreme Court held that his life
sentence for a non-homicide crime violated the Eighth
Amendment because it did not provide him with an opportunity
for release.29 The Court held that none of the four theories of
punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation—justified his sentence.30 As a result, juveniles
who commit offenses other than murder must be provided with
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”31
In Miller, the Court prohibited the application of
mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders who commit
murder and required individualized sentencing hearings.32 The
petitioner in that case, Evan Miller, was fourteen years old at
the time of his crime.33 He was transferred to adult court,
convicted of murder in the course of arson, and received the
mandatory sentence, life in prison without parole.34 Under
Miller, states and the federal government must now choose an
27 Graham, 560 U.S. at 57-58.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 53, 82.
30 Id. at 51.
31 Id. at 75.
32 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
33 Id. at 2462.
34 Id. at 2462-63.
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appropriate sentencing structure to conform to the Court’s
requirements banning the mandatory imposition of a life
sentence without parole.35 A court may still impose a life
sentence after individualized consideration of the juvenile, but
it can no longer be a mandatory sentence and may only be
imposed in rare instances.36 There must be other sentencing
options—a term of years, life with parole, or the opportunity for
sentencing modification instead. Based upon the Court’s
reasoning, the imposition of a mandatory sentence that is the
equivalent of a de facto life sentence should also fall under
Miller’s prohibition,37 although the Court may have to resolve
that issue explicitly.
As a result, states and the federal government must
create alternative sentencing and release structures; courts
and legislators are currently deciding what those alternatives
should look like. Legislators have struggled to agree about the
Court’s requirements—namely, whether to pass laws that will
merely test the bare minimum under the Court’s recent
holdings or whether to aspire to broader reform that is
captured in the Court’s rationale.
Most of the sentences imposing life without parole to
non-homicide offenders have been limited to five states but a
majority of states and the federal government all permitted
such sentences to be imposed upon juvenile non-homicide
offenders prior to Graham.38 At the time the Court decided
Graham, there were approximately 123 juveniles serving life
without parole sentences for non-homicide crimes.39 Graham’s
reach, however, is even more significant for two reasons. First,
there are many juveniles serving lengthy sentences that are
the equivalent to life sentences. Juvenile offenders receive
sentences that require lengthy terms-of-years that can surpass
the end of life—known as “de facto” life sentences;40 Graham
35 Id.
36 Id. at 2460.
37 See Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW &
INEQ. 263, 324 (2013) (discussing that “a lengthy mandatory minimum sentence
imposed on a juvenile may violate Miller/Jackson’s injunction that the sentence take
[into] account . . . youthfulness”).
38 Brief for Petitioner at 27, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2009) (No. 08-
7412), 2009 WL 2159655, at *63. Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have
sentencing structures permitting the sentence. Id.
39 Graham, 560 U.S. at 62.
40 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 2, at 5 n.10.
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should apply there, as well. But there is no centralized data
about how many juveniles are serving de facto life sentences.41
Second, there are numerous juveniles serving life with
parole, and Graham and Miller raise new questions about
whether parole actually provides meaningful opportunities for
release under some of those state systems. It is estimated that
there are nearly 8000 people serving parole eligible life sentences
for crimes they committed as juveniles,42 some of which are for
non-homicide crimes. Of inmates in general who are serving
parole eligible life sentences, thirty-six percent of them have been
convicted for non-homicide crimes.43 All states except for Alaska
allow for life sentences with the possibility of parole, and statistics
suggest that the possibility of parole may be quite dim;44 certainly,
less than meaningful. In California, for example, a Stanford
University study demonstrated that lifers in general have an 18%
chance of being released.45 In some years, the number was as low
as zero. In the same vein, offenders who are serving parole []
eligible life sentences are “increasingly less likely to be released”
than they were in earlier decades.46
Graham and Miller raise new questions about whether
parole actually provides meaningful opportunities for release given
the reality of many state systems. This analysis uses Graham and
Miller as a departure point to consider reformmore broadly.
B. Implementation of Graham andMiller
Some states passed legislation related to Graham and
Miller more quickly than others and the responses have varied.
But there has not been much discussion analyzing whether
parole boards or judges are the best gatekeepers to provide for a
meaningful review under Graham and alternatives to life
without parole under Miller. In Florida, where Terrance
41 Id. (noting that “[d]ata on the extensive use of these ‘virtual life’ sentences
has not yet been systematically collected but would likely show that sentences spanning
many decades, easily exceeding an average lifespan, are increasingly common”).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 7. Nearly 14% of those offenses are sexual assault or rape and 14%
are either aggravated assault, robbery or kidnapping. Id. Another 4% are for property
offenses and 2% are for drugs, while the remaining 2% are other crimes. Id.
44 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 2, at 3; Sharon Dolovich, Creating
the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY?
96, 110 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sara eds., 2012).
45 ROBERT WEISBERG ET AL., STANFORD L. SCH., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE
CTR., LIFE IN LIMBO: AN EXAMINATION OF PAROLE RELEASES FOR PRISONERS SERVING
LIFE SENTENCES WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2011).
46 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 2, at 14.
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Graham’s case originated, for example, the legislature proposed
bills with a variety of approaches before finally agreeing in 2014
to judicial review through sentencing modification. In 2010, in
the early aftermath of Graham, Florida legislators proposed bills
that would have reinstated parole for these offenders.47 After
more than four years of disagreement, the legislature chose
judicial resentencing for compliance with both Graham and
Miller. Instead of reinstituting parole, offenders will receive
sentences that allow them to apply to the court for a second look
sentencing hearing.48 Other states with parole systems in place
have elected to use the parole process with minor or significant
changes for application to those convicted as juveniles.
1. Preliminary Questions
Much of the court attention through late 2014 focused on
retroactivity of Miller,49 compliance with Graham,50 and
application of Graham to de facto life sentences—lengthy
sentences that amount to the equivalent or near equivalent of a
life sentence.51 Scholarship discussing state compliance with
Graham and Miller up to this point has thoroughly discussed
questions about Graham’s application to virtual life sentences
and Miller’s potential retroactive application.52 It has also
47 H.B. 29, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010); see also Sally Terry Green,
Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide
Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 38 (2011).
48 FLA. STAT. § 921.1402 (2014).
49 See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013) (holding that
Miller is retroactive); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 76 (Iowa 2013) (applying Miller
retroactively); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 276 (Mass.
2013) (holding thatMiller is retroactive).
50 See, e.g., Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2010) (resentencing
defendant to allow for parole eligibility where defendant had received a mandatory sentence
of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense); State v. Dyer, 77
So. 3d 928, 933 (La. 2011) (resentencing defendant to allow for parole eligibility in place of
life sentence without the possibility of parole in compliance with Graham); State v. Macon,
86 So. 3d 662, 665-66 (La. Ct. App. 2012), superseded by statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN
§ 15:574.4(B) (resentencing defendant, who received life without the possibility of parole for
rape, to allow for parole eligibility in compliance withGraham).
51 See, e.g., Goins v. Smith, 556 F. App’x 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding
that Graham does not clearly apply to de facto life sentences and noting that courts are
split over the application of Graham as to lengthy terms-of-years sentences); People v.
Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (holding that Graham applies to de facto life
sentences); Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that
Graham does not apply to de facto life sentences).
52 See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87. WASH L. REV. 51, 53
(2012) (discussing issues before state courts upon implementation of Graham,
including application to de facto life sentences); Mark T. Freeman, Comment,
Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v. Florida and the Reality of De Facto LWOP
Sentences, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 961, 963-64 (2013) (discussing the questions
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recognized the potential of both decisions to alter youth offender
sentencing altogether,53 and the implications for Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.54 But on a more granular level, the
process that will provide a meaningful vehicle for release under
Graham or a meaningful alternative to life without the
possibility of release underMiller remains an open question.55
The Court did not expressly resolve the question about
de facto life sentences and the dissent in Graham foreshadowed
disagreement about the issue should it eventually reach the
Court.56 Most scholars and some courts that have considered
the issue agree that it should apply to such sentences;57 but
other courts have held that it does not.58 For example, in
California, the state Supreme Court agreed that a term-of-
years sentence which totaled 110 years contravened Graham’s
application of the Eighth Amendment.59 It suggested that the
legislature step in and clarify for courts that Graham applies.60
Other courts, both federal and state, have also held that
presented by lengthy term-of-years sentences under Graham); Marsha L. Levick &
Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller v. Jackson: Obtaining Relief in
Court and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 380 (2013) (arguing that
Miller is retroactive); Krisztina Schlessel, Graham’s Applicability to Term-of-Years
Sentences and Mandate to Provide a “Meaningful Opportunity” for Release, 40 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1027, 1052-54 (2013) (reviewing court decisions and arguing that Graham
applies to lengthy term-of-years sentences and proposing that the availability of parole
or sentencing review hearings must be extended to all juvenile non-homicide offenders
who are sentenced to term-of-years sentences).
53 Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too
Young to Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107, 108 (2013) (advancing a Youth
Discount method of sentencing, which is “a proportional reduction of adult sentence
lengths based on the youth of the offender”).
54 Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 49, 49 (2010)
(analyzing Graham’s impact on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence going forward);
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine in: The Supreme
Court Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-off Approaches to Eighth
Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 79 (2010).
55 For the most thorough exploration of parole’s sufficiency under Graham,
see generally Sarah French Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State
Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, (2014) (providing an in
depth discussion about the potential limitations of current state parole practices to
comply with Graham).
56 “Nothing in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a
term of years without the possibility of parole.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 124
(2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
57 See, e.g., Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295; Drinan, supra note 52, at 72-75 (concluding
that the “GrahamCourt’s rationale precludes excessive term-of-years sentences”).
58 See, e.g., Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom.
Bunch v. Bobby, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013); Adams v. State, 707 S.E.2d 359, 365 (Ga. 2011).
59 Caballero, 282 P.3d at 293, 295.
60 Id. at 296 n.5.
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lengthy sentences that are the functional equivalent of life
invoke Graham and are prohibited.61
In contrast, appellate courts in Florida have held
otherwise; for example, one court held there was no Eighth
Amendment violation under Graham where a thirteen-year-old
received sentences totaling 90 years in the aggregate for two
separate cases.62 Florida courts have been the source of the
highest number of judicial decisions in the debate,63 likely
because the state has many juveniles with life and lengthy
terms-of-years sentences.64 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
and some state courts have held that Graham does not apply to
lengthy term-of-years sentences so long as there is a chance that
the offender will be released before his death or where the
juvenile received aggregate sentences.65 The decisions have
generated criticism for their failure to comply with both the
letter and the spirit of the Court’s holding in Graham.66 Finally,
under Miller, retroactivity remains unresolved in courts until
the Supreme Court resolves the issue.67 Legislatures also
61 See, e.g., id. at 295; Thomas v. Pennsylvania, No. 10-4537, 2012 WL
6678686, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2012).
62 Walle v. State, 99 So. 3d 967, 968, 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
63 See, e.g., Guzman v. State, 110 So. 3d 480, 481, 483 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.,
2013) (holding that Graham did not apply where juvenile received a sixty year sentence
because the sentence was neither a life sentence nor its equivalent); see also Schlessel,
supra note 52 (discussing existing case law debating Graham’s applicability to lengthy
term of years sentences and de facto life sentences, many of which are in Florida).
64 Cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 64 (2010) (explaining that the majority
of life sentenced juveniles with non-homicide offenses, “77 in total, are serving
sentences imposed in Florida”).
65 See Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub
nom. Bunch v. Bobby, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013) (holding that Graham does not clearly
establish that “consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juveniles who have committed
multiple nonhomicide offenses are unconstitutional when they amount to the practical
equivalent of life without parole” and noting that courts are split on the issue); State v.
Kasic, 265 P.3d 410, 414-15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011), aff ’d, No. 2 Ca-CR 2013-0307-PR,
2013 WL 6823267 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2013) (holding that Graham was not
applicable where a seventeen-year-old received an aggregate sentence of nearly 140
years for separate crimes that occurred within one year); Walle, 99 So. 3d at 973
(holding that Graham did not apply where a thirteen-year-old received sentences
totaling ninety years in the aggregate for two separate cases); Adams v. State, 707
S.E.2d 359, 365 (Ga. 2011).
66 Schlessel, supra note 52, at 1057.
67 See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 122 (Iowa 2013) (holding that
Miller applies retroactively); State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 841 (La. 2013) (holding that
Miller is not retroactive), cert. denied sub nom. Tate v. Louisiana, 134 S. Ct. 2663
(2014); State v. Toca, 141 So. 3d 265, 266 (La. 2014) (holding the Miller does not apply
retroactively), cert. granted, No. 14-6381 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2014) (No. 14-6381);
Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E. 3d 270, 281 (Mass 2013) (holding
that Miller applies retroactively); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 508 (Wyo. 2014)
(holding the Miller applies retroactively).
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disagree about whether to afford relief to those already
sentenced absent additional instruction by the Supreme Court.
Setting aside retroactivity, legislators and courts have
generally chosen two main courses of action as to Miller. First, in
some states, life without parole remains a sentencing option as
Miller permits, and the judge may now issue a parole eligible life
or other term-of-years sentence instead.68 For example, in
Pennsylvania, home to the highest number of juveniles sentenced
to life without parole, the legislation will not apply retroactively
until the Supreme Court expressly resolves the question. Going
forward, a juvenile convicted of homicide will either be sentenced
to life without parole or a life sentence requiring him to serve at
least thirty-five years before he is parole eligible if he is over
fifteen.69 Second, in some instances, states have banned life
without parole altogether as a sentencing option for juveniles;
instead, juveniles must become parole eligible or eligible for
sentencing review after serving a certain term of years.70
Therefore, particularly in states which have banned life without
parole for juveniles, all juvenile offenders who receive long
sentences will now be included in the same resentencing or back
end review process; but typically, homicide offenders must first
serve more time before becoming eligible for review.71
State courts and legislators must also assign a point at
which someone who is sentenced to life, for a crime he
committed as a juvenile, should be eligible for release review.72
Some of the new laws provide juvenile offenders with an
opportunity for release consideration at certain fixed points
during a lengthy incarceration.73 For now, that decision is up to
the states.74 There are a range of opinions about how much time
68 See, e.g., S.B. 850, 2011 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012); S.B. 39, 2013
Leg. Assemb., 88th Sess. (S.D. 2013); S.B. 228, 2013 Leg. Gen. Sess. (Utah 2013).
69 S.B. 850, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012).
70 See, e.g., H.B. 2116, 2014 Leg. Sess. (Haw. 2014); S.B. 2, 83d Leg., 2d Spec.
Sess. (Tex. 2013); H.B. 4210, 2014 Leg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014); H.B. 23, 62d Leg., Gen.
Sess. (Wyo. 2013); see also Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 282-86 (Mass. 2013).
71 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4204A(d)(1), § 4204A(d)(2); H.B. 5221,
2014 Leg. Sess. (Conn. 2014) (creating a second look sentencing provision for all
juvenile offenders instead of parole); H.B. 4210, 2014 Leg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014)
(juveniles will come up for parole after fifteen years.
72 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75-76 (2010). The American Bar Association
suggests that all “[y]outhful offenders should generally be eligible for parole or other early
release consideration at a reasonable point during their sentence; and, if denied, should be
reconsidered for parole or early release periodically thereafter.” AM. BAR ASS’N,
RECOMMENDATION 105C, at 1 (Feb. 11, 2008), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2008_my_105c.authcheckdam.pdf.
73 See infra Subsection I.B.2-3.
74 Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 (“What the State must do, however, is give
defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
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a juvenile must first serve before release review; one court has
held that review must be available after ten years,75 elsewhere, a
juvenile convicted of murder must first serve up to forty years.76
It is up to courts and legislators not only to decide when
review will be available, but also who should be responsible for
making the release decision ultimately and upon what basis it
will be made. Some states have chosen parole boards and, in
other states, the judiciary will review applications for release
instead of a parole board. State approaches to the latter two
questions are considered next.
2. Administrative Remedy
In oral argument during Graham, Justices Alito and
Roberts inquired about what kind of sentencing or release
procedure would be necessary should the Court determine that
life without parole was not a permissible sentence.77 Graham’s
counsel responded with a request for some “meaningful
opportunity” to demonstrate that he has reformed and can now
live in society.78 This response appears to have inspired the
standard the Court chose. The Court explained that when
juveniles commit non-homicide crimes, “if it imposes a sentence of
life [the government] must provide him or her with some realistic
opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.”79
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. It is for the State, in the first instance, to
explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.”).
75 Although the Federal District Court order was stayed, thus far it is the shortest
time frame put forth by a court or legislature. Order Requiring Immediate Compliance with
Miller, Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568 (E.D. Mich, Nov. 26, 2013), available at
http://www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/file/HillOrderRequiringParoleProcess.pdf
(requiring review for all juvenile offenders serving life without parole sentences after
ten years).
76 See e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West) & TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 508.145(b) (requiring forty years in prison prior to parole review for juvenile homicide
offenders); see also La.REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(E)(1) (2014) (requiring juvenile homicide offenders
who do not receivemandatory life to serve thirty-five years before parole eligibility).
77 Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)
(No. 08-7412), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2009/2009_08_7412
(click “Graham v. Florida—Oral Argument” then “Full Transcript Text”).
78 Id. Terrance Graham’s counsel responded to judicial inquiry, stating: “All
that would have to be required is a meaningful opportunity to the adolescent offender
to demonstrate that he has in fact changed, reformed, and is now fit to live in society.
It—that’s all. That’s all we are asking for. We are not asking that it be automatic right
to get back out.” Id.
79 Graham, 560 U.S. at 82.
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a. Compliance through Current Parole Process
Some states have determined that compliance with
Graham will be satisfied so long as defendants who commit
juvenile offenses become parole eligible at some point.80 The
first few courts to consider Graham resentencing cases did not
require any substantive or procedural change to the existing
state parole process for those offenders.81 In Pennsylvania, the
legislature has determined that Graham and Miller will be
satisfied through potential opportunities for parole.82
For example, shortly after the Court issued its ruling in
Graham, the Iowa Supreme Court considered the case of Julio
Bonilla, who was sentenced to a mandatory life without the
possibility of parole for a kidnapping that he committed when
he was sixteen.83 Because Bonilla was a juvenile at the time of
the offense, his sentence fell squarely within Graham’s
prohibition.84 The court ordered that if Bonilla was eligible for
parole consideration, the sentence would comply with
Graham.85 Shortly thereafter, the legislature amended the
statute so that defendants who receive a life sentence for
committing non-homicide offenses before they are eighteen
must first serve twenty-five years of the life sentence before
they become eligible for annual parole review.86
The Iowa code states the criteria that the parole board
should consider upon its review of a parole release
application.87 These include common factors such as the
defendant’s criminal and social history, behavior and attitude
in prison, and physical and mental examinations.88 The board
80 See Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa 2010); State v. Dyer, 77 So.
3d 928, 930 (La. 2011); State v. Macon, 86 So. 3d 662, 665-66 (La. Ct. App. 2012),
superseded by statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 15:574.4(B).
81 Bonilla, 791 N.W.2d at 700-01; Macon, 86 So. 3d at 665-66.
82 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1 (West).
83 Bonilla, 791 N.W.2d at 698-99.
84 Id. at 700-01.
85 Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 906.5 (2014)).
86 IOWA CODE § 902.1(2)(a) (2011), invalidated by State v. Ragland, 836
N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013); State v. Hoeck, 838 N.W.2d 680 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013). The
relevant code provision in place at the time of the court’s decision did not provide for a
minimum amount of time that a defendant in Bonilla’s situation must first serve before
parole consideration.
87 IOWA CODE § 906.5(3) (2013) (stating that the parole “board shall consider
all pertinent information regarding the person, including the circumstances of the
person’s offense, any presentence report which is available, the previous social history
and criminal record of the person, the person’s conduct, work, and attitude in prison,
and the reports of physical and mental examinations that have been made”).
88 Id. The Iowa Code does not state whether the parole board must give
reasons for its denial or whether counsel may be present or appointed.
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is not required to perform an in-person interview or a hearing
under its current statute.89 When the board chooses to
interview applicants, evidence demonstrates that applicants
are more likely to be released.90 However, the appellate court
has upheld the board’s ability to use its discretion about
whether to conduct personal interviews of applicants.91
In 2012, the Louisiana Supreme Court, consistent with
Iowa, also determined that the current system of parole review
satisfies Graham. It held that the release decision “falls within
the exclusive purview of the Board of Parole, charged with the
duty of ordering parole.”92 In the court’s view, a prisoner’s access
to consideration by the parole board satisfies Graham.93 The court
did not add any additional procedural requirements or protections
nor did it address release criteria for juvenile offenders.94
At the time of the court’s decision in Louisiana, an
inmate sentenced to life for a non-homicide crime he committed
as a juvenile would be eligible for parole after turning forty-five
and serving twenty years of the sentence.95 Soon thereafter, the
legislature passed a law increasing the time a person must
serve before he becomes parole eligible; juvenile defendants
convicted of non-homicide crimes who receive life sentences
must serve at least thirty years of the sentence before they will
become eligible for parole.96 Those who commit first or second-
degree murder must serve thirty-five years unless they receive
life without the possibility of parole.97
The new law includes factors for consideration that
mirror the criteria for parole applicants generally in Louisiana.98
The offender must also meet certain criteria establishing that he
is at low risk of reoffending “pursuant to a validated risk
89 Taylor v. State, 752 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008) (describing a
legislative amendment in 1995 such that the board is required only to perform case file
reviews instead of personal interviews and upholding its retroactive application to inmates).
90 Id. at 29-30.
91 Id. at 30.
92 State v. Dyer, 77 So. 3d 928, 931 (La. 2011).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 930. However, it held that access to the parole board cannot be
dependent upon a commutation by the governor under Graham. Id.
95 Id.
96 LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(D)(1) (2014).
97 Id. § 15:574.4(E)(1). The court has not yet had the occasion to determine
whether the additional ten year requirement conflicts with its previous holding in State
v. Dyer about the parole scheme’s compliance with Graham.
98 For example, the inmate must receive his G.E.D., complete a substance
abuse treatment program, if applicable, and 100 hours of prerelease programming, as
well as, completing a separate reentry program. Id. § 15:574.4(E)(1) .
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assessment instrument.”99 It contains one unique provision
requiring that an expert in adolescent brain development and
behavior will prepare a report for consideration in the parole
decision.100 Generally, the applicant must receive the votes of all
members of a three person panel in order to gain release.101
Similarly, Nebraska passed a law that includes a list of
factors for consideration when juveniles are sentenced to life
and later considered for parole.102 At a minimum, the parole
board must consider factors such as rehabilitation, maturity,
and age at the time of offense.103
b. Mandating Reform to Parole Process for Graham
Compliance
In contrast, other decision makers have found that
current parole procedures must be amended in order to provide
a meaningful opportunity for review. One federal court in
Michigan and some legislatures have added procedural
safeguards and substantive criteria for juvenile sentence and
release review.104
California passed two separate laws initiating juvenile
offender release reform, ultimately granting the release
decision to the parole board. California’s Youth Offender Parole
Hearings law, known as S.B. 260, passed in 2013 and modified
the criteria as applied to eligible juvenile offenders.105 In its
wake, a handful of other states have either proposed or passed
similar legislation.106 California’s law acknowledges that its
intent is to “create a process by which growth and maturity of
youthful offenders can be assessed and a meaningful
opportunity for release established.”107 It implicitly suggests
that its current system was not sufficiently meaningful. In
addition, it is more expansive than a minimal reading of
Graham or Miller requires.
99 Id. § 15:574.4(E)(1)(f).
100 Id. § 15:574.4(D)(2).
101 Id. § 15:574.2(C).
102 NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,110.04 (2013).
103 Id.
104 Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26,
2013), available at http://www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/ACLU_JuvenileLife_
OriginalRuling.pdf.; Order Requiring Immediate Compliance with Miller, Hill v. Snyder,
No. 10-14568 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2013), available at http://www.aclumich.org/
sites/default/files/file/HillOrderRequiringParoleProcess.pdf.
105 S.B. 260, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
106 See, e.g., H.B. 4210, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014).
107 S.B. 260, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2013).
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First, in California, eligibility includes life-sentenced
juvenile offenders, as well as those who received a lengthy
term-of-years.108 Almost all youth convicted are eligible for
relief, with some exceptions;109 and a separate law addresses
those serving life without the possibility of parole.110 S.B. 260
addresses the parole process and is applicable to juveniles
serving parole eligible life sentences and other lengthy terms,
including determinate sentences.111
Second, California’s law providing for parole release
does not limit application to non-homicide offenders, thus,
extending beyond the minimum requirements of Graham. In
California alone, it is estimated that over 2,000 juveniles are
serving life sentences that include the possibility of parole. In
addition, many are serving lengthy determinate sentences for
offenses they committed as juveniles.112 It is estimated that
approximately 5,000 offenders who are currently housed in
California’s prisons are eligible for relief under S.B. 260.113
California’s law is explicit about its goal to provide a
parole eligibility mechanism whereby a juvenile offender may
show that he or she “has been rehabilitated and gained
maturity.”114 The law includes the Supreme Court’s language
from Graham and Miller to provide standards that apply to all
lengthy sentences imposed upon juveniles. It requires that
parole board commissioners “shall give great weight to the
diminished culpability of minors as compared to adults, the
hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and
increased maturity” of the prisoner.115 It requires a licensed
psychologist to administer a risk assessment instrument and the
instrument itself must take into account diminished culpability
of youth and subsequent growth and maturity.116
Finally, California’s S.B. 260 provides a specific time
line for parole eligibility and requires the Department of
Corrections to notify juveniles prior to their review eligibility
108 Id. § 4(b).
109 Id. § 4(h). The statute does not apply, for example, to offenders sentenced
as juveniles under Jessica’s law or sentenced under the three strikes law. Id.
110 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West 2013); S.B. 9, 2012 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2012).
111 S.B. 260, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
112 Elizabeth Calvin, Human Rights Watch, Juvenile Life Without Parole:
Resentencing and Policy Update Presentation at the National Juvenile Defender
Center Leadership Summit (Nov. 1, 2013) (notes on file with author).
113 Id.
114 S.B. 260, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
115 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (West 2014).
116 Id. § 3051(f).
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date. For most convictions, juvenile will be eligible to seek
parole if his or her sentence is more than fifteen years, with a
few exceptions related to offenses. But the point at which he or
she may do so will vary.117
Some aspects of current parole policies will inevitably
lead to court involvement related to Graham and Miller
compliance. For example, Michigan houses the second largest
number of juveniles serving mandatory sentences of life
without parole. In Hill v. Snyder, the federal plaintiffs are
inmates in Michigan who were sentenced to life without parole
for homicide convictions they received as juveniles; they
challenged the constitutionality of the state statute denying
them access to parole.118 Although the plaintiffs were sentenced
for homicide, they argued that they, too, have a right to a
meaningful opportunity for release, using the rationale from
Graham. In addition, after the Miller decision, they argued
that the parole scheme in its current form violates both
Graham and Miller because parole can be denied for any
reason;119 close inspection of the parole process in Michigan
provides insights into the merits of the plaintiffs’ arguments.
In response, the Hill court specifically ordered the state
to “[c]reate an administrative structure” to determine parole
eligibility for prisoners sentenced to life without parole for
crimes committed as juveniles.120 The order provided that the
new process must be “fair[ and] meaningful[.]”121 The court
ordered that five specific items must be present within the new
state structure. First, it ordered that the state must begin
parole review for any relevant offenders who have completed
ten years of their sentences. Second, it stated that this
structure must include the provision of public hearings for
“each of the eligible prisoners making application for
consideration.”122 Third, the order requires the parole board to
explain its decisions if it denies parole and would bar the
117 S.B. 260, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4(b)(1) (Cal. 2013). Those who receive
determinate sentences will be eligible after serving 15 or 20 years of the sentence,
depending upon the length of the sentence. Those who are serving sentences that are 25
years to life will be eligible to seek parole after 25 years. Id.
118 Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198, at *3 (E.D. Mich, Nov.
26, 2013).
119 Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013WL 364198, at *3 (E.D.Mich, Nov. 26, 2013).
120 Order Requiring Immediate Compliance with Miller, Hill v. Snyder, No.
10-14568 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2013), available at http://www.aclumich.org/sites/
default/files/file/HillOrderRequiringParoleProcess.pdf.
121 Id. at 2.
122 Id.
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board’s use of “no interest” orders.123 “No interest” orders are
brief orders denying parole after interviews without
explanation. Fourth, the court directed that, under the new
structure, no one may veto a decision to grant parole, including
the sentencing judge.124 Finally, it required access to
rehabilitative programming.125 The state appealed the order
and the Sixth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal.126
The court has ordered Michigan to allow all juvenile
lifers a parole hearing after ten years.127 That part of the order is
consistent with the aspirations of the ABA and American Law
Institute, both of which propose reform that allows post
sentencing review for all juveniles.128 But in light of the current
parole process, all of these changes would be significant if the
order is upheld. For example, Michigan does not provide public
hearings automatically to parole applicants who are serving life
sentences. Instead, one board member makes this decision based
upon the risk assessment score.129 The interviewer may then
grant or deny a parole hearing and the sentencing judge may
object to the decision to grant a hearing.130
In contrast, the Hill order significantly alters the
current process by providing for the automatic right to the
public hearing and prohibiting veto, something the current
state law permits at two different stages.131 In practical terms,
judicial objection is frequent in Michigan, where judges are
elected. Between 2007 and 2012, the parole board scheduled
171 public hearings for parole applicants serving life sentences




126 Order at 4-5, Maxey v. Snyder, No. 13-2661 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013), available
at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/ag/Hill_v._Snyder_6th_Cir._Order_443146_7.pdf.
127 Order Requiring Immediate Compliance with Miller, Hill v. Snyder, No.
10-14568 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2013), available at http://www.aclumich.org/sites/
default/files/file/HillOrderRequiringParoleProcess.pdf.
128 AM. BAR ASS’N., supra note 72, at 16; MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 6.11A(h) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (stating that juvenile offenders should be
eligible for a second look sentencing hearing after ten years).
129 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.235 (2012).
130 Id. § 791.234. “Parole shall not be granted if the sentencing judge, or the
judge’s successor in office, files written objections to the granting of the parole within
30 days of receipt of the notice of hearing.” Id.
131 Collins v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 395 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
(discussing and upholding the Michigan statute allowing for a veto by the sentencing
judge or her successor). “The Legislature may create a parole system primarily within
the executive branch of government which . . . is subject to a judicial veto, without
being in violation of the constitutional provisions relating to separation of powers.” Id.
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judges exercised their veto power.132 The majority of the judicial
objections were based upon the applicant’s initial offense.133 In
over a quarter of the judicial hearing vetoes, judges did not
provide a reason and most of the objections came from judges
who had succeeded the original sentencing judge.134
Once an offender serving a life sentence in Michigan
advances in the process to a public hearing, he must receive the
vote of a majority of the 10-member board in order to be
released.135 The prosecutor may then appeal a parole board’s
release decision to the sentencing judge.136 Therefore, the
removal of veto power under the Hill order by any other entity,
including the judge, is significant at this stage, as well.137
Compliance with the Hill order would mean that access to
a hearing would no longer be contingent upon the screening by
one board member, nor the lack of opposition by the sentencing
judge or his successor. While the order does not address the
substance of the release decision, as of 2008, Michigan’s parole
system uses a computerized risk assessment tool.138
Significantly, applicants are afforded more rights in and
after a parole hearing than they are after only a screening
interview.139 For example, when an applicant is denied the
opportunity to proceed to a full hearing, the Michigan Court of
Appeals has upheld the parole board’s use of “no interest”
132 See CITIZENS ALLIANCE ON PRISONS & PUB. SPENDING, PROPOSAL TO AMEND
PROCESS FOR JUDICIAL OBJECTIONS TO LIFER PAROLES 1 (Aug. 2012), available at
http://house.michigan.gov/sessiondocs/2013-2014/testimony/Committee232-2-21-2013-1.pdf.
133 Id.
134 Id. Normally, in Michigan, once a judge intervenes to object to a public
hearing for a person serving life, the applicant must then wait five years for
reconsideration by the parole board. Id.
135 In re Elias, 811 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (citing The Parole
Consideration Process, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (2014),
http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,4551,7-119-1384-22909--,00.html).
136 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.234(11) (2010). This law became effective in 1992
after the legislature overhauled the parole system in place at the time.
137 This has added significance considering that an inmate is not appointed
counsel when the state appeals the decision to grant release to the court. In re Hill, 827
N.W.2d 407, 417 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012). “As applied in this case, Hill did not have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest when the Board granted him parole such that
he was entitled to appointed counsel during the pendency of the prosecutor’s appeal.” Id.
138 See, e.g., In re Elias, 811 N.W.2d 541, 548, 551 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
139 Compare In re Glover, 614 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)
(affirming Parole Board denial of parole when supported by written explanation of its
reasons), with MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.235(12) (2012) (providing that “when the
parole board makes a final determination not to release a prisoner, the prisoner shall
be provided with a written explanation of the reason for denial and, if appropriate,
specific recommendations for corrective action the prisoner may take to facilitate
release”), and Gilmore v. Parole Bd., 635 N.W.2d 345, 347 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)
(denying the right to an appeal or written explanation when a parole hearing is denied
after a parole interview).
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orders.140 It specifically held that parole applicants serving life
sentences are not entitled to explanations at that stage of the
parole process141—the Hill order contravenes that practice.142
The applicant is not entitled to appointment of counsel,143
however, and the Hill order does not contemplate the provision
of counsel to affected parole applicants.
3. Use of Judicial Remedy
New laws allowing for sentencing modification, rather
than parole access, are particularly relevant for states and the
federal government whose sentencing laws have abolished or
seriously curtailed parole.144 To date, a few states—including
Florida and Delaware—have adopted sentencing modifications
post Graham and Miller.145 It is likely that the Federal
Government will follow suit given its abolition of parole. The
Model Penal Code’s proposed draft revisions also utilize
sentencing modification, rather than parole, where lengthy
sentences are imposed.146 Of note, Oregon is the only state that
had a limited second look provision in place prior to Graham
but it is not available to serious offenders such as those under
Graham andMiller.147
140 Gilmore, 635 N.W.2d at 347 (“Common in these appeals are the questions
whether . . . an inmate serving a parolable life sentence is entitled to a written
explanation for the Parole Board’s decision of ‘no interest’ in taking further action after
the prisoner’s statutorily mandated interview . . . and whether the Parole Board’s
decision of ‘no interest’ is reviewable by the circuit court. We answer both questions in
the negative.” (internal citation omitted)).
141 Id.
142 Furthermore, the Michigan courts have held that the decisions to deny a
public hearing after a parole board interview are not appealable by the applicant
because they are not the same as “final orders” denying parole at the hearing stage. Id.
at 351. Therefore, as a result of the Order, juvenile lifers would not be precluded from
an appeal because they would no longer be denied before a public hearing occurs.
143 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.235(6).
144 Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1196, 1221 (2005) (including a list
of state practices and noting that only a “minority of existing state guidelines systems
retain parole release discretion for all felons sentenced to prison, and several other
states retain it for certain crimes”).
145 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i)(B) (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4204 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 921.1402 (2014).
146 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
147 OR. REV. STAT. § 420A.203 (2011). Juveniles who are tried as adults in
Oregon most frequently are charged with crimes that fall under Oregon’s “Measure 11”
law which makes them ineligible for Oregon’s Second Look provision. See JASON
ZIEDENBERG ET AL., CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR SAFETY
AND JUSTICE, MISGUIDED MEASURES: THE OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS OF MEASURE 11 ON
OREGON’S YOUTH 26 (2011), available at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/
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In both Delaware and Florida, the legislatures had
previously abolished parole pursuant to the truth in sentencing
movement,148 so sentencing modification was a more likely
choice. While Delaware is not a big player in terms of the
number of juveniles serving lengthy sentences as compared to
other states, Florida is among the top five states for the
number of juveniles serving life sentences.149
Delaware was one of the first states to pass legislation
addressing Graham and Miller; and it was the first law to place
the judiciary exclusively in the gatekeeping role for post
sentencing release reform for juvenile offenders. Delaware
banned juvenile life without parole entirely and applied the ban
retroactively. The legislation allows resentencing to anyone
already serving a life sentence for a conviction obtained as a
juvenile. Under Delaware’s new laws, juveniles who were
sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide crimes may
petition Superior Court for a sentencing modification after
twenty years.150 Juveniles who were convicted of homicide and
previously sentenced to life without parole may petition for
resentencing after thirty-five years.151 The inmate, if denied, is
eligible to reapply after an additional five years.152
The legislation itself, however, did not lay out
procedural rules and substantive criteria; rather, it granted the
court the authority to promulgate the appropriate rules for
filing and litigation for sentencing modification.153 The
Delaware Superior Court rules, promulgated in early 2014,
provide for the appointment of counsel “only in the exercise of
discretion and for good cause shown.”154 Next, they establish a
presumption that there will be no hearing.155 The rules permit
the judge to request more information about “the mitigating
factors of the [offender’s] youth at the time of the offense,”
documents/Misguided_ Measures_July_2011.pdf. There is surprisingly little commentary
or case law discussing its implementation.
148 PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 139 (describing “truth in sentencing” reform
and the Crime Control Act of 1984 which abolished parole release at the federal level
and led states to follow suit).
149 See State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without
Parole (JLWOP), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2009/10/02/state-distribution-juvenile-offenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole.
150 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4204A(d)(1) (2013).
151 Id. § 4204A(d)(2).
152 Id. § 4204A(d)(3). However, the judge may extend that time if she “finds
there to be no reasonable likelihood that the interests of justice will require another
hearing within [five] years.” Id.
153 Id. § 4204A(d)(5).
154 DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 35A(c).
155 DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 35A(d)(1).
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rehabilitation, and initial sentencing, but do not require court
consideration of any particular characteristics.156 The court
may also ask that the Department of Corrections provide a
certification that the offender “will not constitute a substantial
risk to the community” or himself.157
The court also issued a formal Case Management Plan
for resentencing hearings for juvenile offenders who were
previously sentenced that does provide these rights.158 Unlike
the Court’s rules for prospective cases, the Court’s Case
Management Plan requires the assignment of counsel and
appears to presume there will be resentencing hearings.159
Furthermore, the Delaware Sentencing Accountability
Commission later included substantive criteria in the judicial
bench book, drawing from Miller.160 In the first year of
implementation with retroactive cases, the courts have
followed general sentencing norms. The Public Defender’s
Office worked to identify cases to ensure eligible applicants
were represented and judges have held resentencing hearings
where they have explained their decisions on the record.161
Courts have followed the Case Management Plan issued by the
court for retroactive cases.162 The administration of those cases
can provide a framework for future cases administered under
the new sentencing laws.
Unlike Delaware, Florida’s law does not provide relief
for homicide offenders who have already been sentenced absent
the future ruling on retroactivity by the U.S. Supreme Court.
But going forward, most offenders will have access to
sentencing modification, leaving only a small category of
offenders sentenced for juvenile crimes without the possibility
for release. Florida’s law includes a comprehensive list of
required factors that courts must consider for release,
including whether the individual “demonstrates maturity and
rehabilitation,” successful completion of programs while
incarcerated, remorse, and risk level, including evidence put
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 As a result, the Court adopted the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DEL.,
CRIMINAL CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR RESENTENCING PROCEEDINGS UNDER 79 DEL.
LAWS. C. 37 (2013) AND 11 DEL. C. § 4209A (on file with author).
159 Id.
160 DEL. SENTENCING ACCOUNTABILITY COMM’N, BENCHBOOK 2014, at 1, 136-
37 (2014) (including factors such as family and home environment, familial and peer
pressure, and mental health).
161 Interview with Lisa Minutola, Chief of Legal Services, Delaware Public
Defender’s Office (Oct. 22, 2014) (notes on file with author).
162 Id.
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forward by the defendant.163 The list also includes backward
looking factors that typically would have been considered at
sentencing such as whether there was minimal participation in
the crime and, in some instances, victim impact statements
from the original sentencing.164 By requiring consideration of
rehabilitation and remorse, it strikes a balanced framework.
Procedurally, it requires appointment of counsel and a written
explanation of any decision denying release to the offender who
applies for the sentencing modification.165
Most juvenile offenders who receive sentences longer
than fifteen years may apply to a judge for resentencing after a
certain period of time, depending on the length of the initial
sentence.166 In addition, most juveniles who receive life sentences
may apply for sentencing modification after serving twenty-five
years.167 In effect, the law eliminates life without parole for most
offenders who have not committed a serious felony and degree
murder. If the court denies release, they may apply five or ten
years later, depending on their underlying conviction.168
The judicial role under California’s S.B. 9 is more
limited and specific than it is under the Florida framework.
S.B. 9 works in tandem with the parole process. It utilizes a
judicial route toward review for certain categories of offenders
who received sentences of life without parole for homicide
crimes that they committed when they were younger than
eighteen.169 S.B. 9 is different from the other models because
the judge decides only whether or not the offender can become
parole eligible, shifting the release decision back to the parole
board under S.B. 260.170
S.B. 9 focusses on juvenile homicide offenders who
received life sentences without the possibility of parole. An
eligible defendant must meet one of the following four criteria:
the defendant had an adult co-defendant; no violent juvenile
adjudications before conviction; received the sentence for felony
murder; or must have pursued a path toward rehabilitation
163 FLA. STAT. § 921.1402(6)(a), (b), (e), (g).
164 Id. § 921.1402(6)(c), (d).
165 Id. § 921.1402 (2014).
166 Id. § 921.1402(2)(b)-(d).
167 Id. § 921.1402(2)(d).
168 For example, some offenders must wait ten years to reapply and others
must wait five years depending on their initial sentence.
169 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West 2014).
170 The law provides that the judge can resentence anew and technically, the current
sentencing laws would only permit life with parole eligibility for this class of offenders.
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while in prison.171 The court will hold a sentencing modification
hearing and may resentence the offender so that he is parole
eligible.172 California law also provides specific guidance about
criteria the court should consider. These factors include the
extent of adult supervision during childhood; cognitive or
mental limitations; whether the defendant has availed himself
of rehabilitative or educational opportunities to the extent they
were available to him during incarceration; and maintenance of
family or community ties.173 If the court considers criteria other
than the ones listed in the statute, it must state those factors
and provide an explanation on the record.174
The law also includes a specific timetable for review.175
In California, an eligible offender serving a life without parole
sentence may apply to the court for judicial review after
serving fifteen years,176 and then, if the application is granted,
become parole eligible after twenty-five years.
II. IDENTIFYING THEGATEKEEPER
Graham and Miller ultimately present an opportunity
for innovation as states and the federal government grapple
with the form, reach, and method of juvenile sentencing
reform.177 It is questionable whether funneling juvenile
offenders who receive life sentences or the equivalent into
current state parole systems can provide a meaningful
opportunity to obtain release.178 Without reform, there is a
strong case that most parole systems in their current form, with
171 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(B)(i)-(iv).
172 Id. § 1170(d)(2)(E).
173 Id. § 1170(d)(2)(F)(iv)-(viii) (listing the factors that the court should
consider when deciding a motion for resentencing by a defendant).
174 “In addition to the criteria in subparagraph (F), the court may consider any
other criteria that the court deems relevant to its decision, so long as the court
identifies them on the record, provides a statement of reasons for adopting them, and
states why the defendant does or does not satisfy the criteria.” Id. § 1170(I).
175 Id. §§ 1170(d)(2)(A)(i), (d)(2)(H).
176 Id. § 1170(2)(A)(i). If denied, the offender may then petition twice more:
four years later and once more the following year. Id. § 1170(2)(H).
177 For example, Professor Martin Guggenheim argues that Graham prohibits
current sentencing practices as applied to juveniles in many states. See Martin
Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and A Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate Sentencing, 47
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 489 (2012). “What is impermissible after Graham, however, is
a legislature’s choice to impose an automatic sentence on children that is the same sentence
it imposes on adults for the same crime.” Id.
178 See, e.g., Bierschbach, supra note 14, at 1752; Sarah French Russell,
Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, and the Eighth
Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 421-28 (2014) (discussing procedural limitations of
current state parole practices and the potential Eighth Amendment violations they
pose for juvenile offenders seeking meaningful review).
144 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1
only the most “anemic” protections in place,179 do not.180 Many
states and the federal government do not have a parole board in
place because they have moved to a determinate sentencing
model;181 as a result, some have chosen judicial sentencing
modification procedures, known as “second look” sentencing,
instead of parole. Sentencing modification is also consistent with
the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code proposal on
sentencing provisions, which advocates abolishing parole
entirely.182 The differences between these two potentially viable
paths invite discussion and exploration about what pioneering
methods would be satisfactory or even exemplary.
A. Parole Board Decisions and Reform
At least one scholar has noted that parole is “making a
comeback,” noting its potential role under Graham as one
example of that.183 As predicted, some states have chosen this
route. At the same time, the institutional shortcomings that led
to the decreased use of parole for release beginning in the
1980s raise serious questions about its use as the cure all for
Graham.184 Graham raises the question—does the Eighth
Amendment require something more meaningful?
The “enormous variations” in state parole “policy and
practice” make it “difficult, perhaps impossible, to define a
common American approach to parole at the turn of the
[twenty-first] century.”185 Parole programs and processes are
less scrutinized and, in turn, less understood than other
components of corrections.186 But they do have general common
179 See Bierschbach, supra note 14, at 1752.
180 See id.; Russell, supra note 178, at 421-28. Despite these compelling
arguments, the first wave of court decisions have determined that parole eligibility is
sufficient. See, e.g., Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2010); State v. Dyer, 77
So. 3d 928, 933 (La. 2011); State v. Macon, 86 So. 3d 662, 665-66 (La. Ct. App. 2012),
superseded by statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 15:574.4(B).
181 JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 66-67 tbl. 3.1 (2003).
182 MODELPENALCODE: SENTENCING § 6.06(4)-(5) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
183 See O’Hear, supra note 8, at 1248-49.
184 Bierschbach, supra note 14, at 1752; Sarah French Russell, Review for
Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND.
L.J. 373, 421-28. Professor Russell’s analysis of parole in relation to Graham is the
most comprehensive to date.
185 JEREMY TRAVIS & SARAH LAWRENCE, URBAN INSTITUTE, BEYOND THE
PRISON GATES: THE STATE OF PAROLE IN AMERICA 25 (2002).
186 Laura Appleman, Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1307, 1307 (2007) (characterizing parole as a “component[ ] of hidden sentencing[,]” along
with probation and post-release supervision that are “[l]argely concealed from the public
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characteristics that are relevant to state and federal
compliance with Graham’s Eighth Amendment holding and to
relevant, broader reform questions.187
Historically, there are three common criticisms levelled
against the substance of decision making by parole boards. One
is that parole board members frequently lack relevant
experience prior to appointment. They are typically comprised
of governor appointees who serve fixed terms that vary in
length. Next, many criticize their decision making for being
arbitrary and based more upon personal intuition than data.188
Given the appearance of arbitrariness, the decision-making
process is often criticized for its lack of transparency.189 And
third, the fear that political and public influence has too much
impact casts doubt about the soundness of the decisions.190
Courts require only limited due process from state
parole systems due to the diminished legal interests of inmates
in the process.191 Professor Kevin Reitz writes that, while
procedural protections at sentencing are second-string, the
“procedural accoutrements of parole release are of the third-or
fourth-string variety.”192 That description is a concise preview
of the potential inadequacies of current parole systems for
juvenile release reform.
States generally follow the Supreme Court’s lead, holding
that only minimum standards of due process apply.193 As a
result, they provide “only the most anemic procedural due
process protections.”194 For example, states are not required to
eye” and “have been ignored by both scholars and policy-makers”); Joan Petersila, Parole
and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME&JUSTICE 479, 493 (1999).
187 See generally Russell, supra note 178.
188 PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 133-34 (2002) (describing criticism of parole
practices and the exercise of discretion by parole board members).
189 Appleman, supra note 186, at 1343-44.
190 PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 133-36.
191 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
16 (1979) (holding that a state parole process which provides the inmate with the
opportunity to be heard and which informs him of the reasons he is denied parole
satisfies due process).
192 Kevin R. Reitz, The “Traditional” Indeterminate Sentencing Model, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra note 15, at 283
(emphasis omitted).
193 See, e.g., In re Hill, 827 N.W.2d 407, 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11) (“[T]he mere fact that a state has a parole process is insufficient
to confer a protected liberty interest to a prisoner: ‘That the state holds out the possibility of
parole provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained.’”).
194 Bierschbach, supra note 14, at 1752; seeW. David Ball,Heinous, Atrocious, and
Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 893, 903-04 (2009) (noting that “parole is . . . governed by an underdeveloped and
confusing series of due process cases that is badly in need of review”).
146 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1
provide attorney representation in the parole release process.195
Some states deny the right to have an attorney present for the
procedure at all or, at least, bar them from certain parts of it;196
and only a small group of states provide appointed counsel.197 In
addition, even when the state law permits the prosecutor to
appeal a parole board’s decision to grant parole in court, an
inmate still does not have a right to assigned counsel for the
state’s appeal.198 And, in many states, parolees do not have the
right to appear at hearings.199 Finally, the standards used by
parole boards lack any component that would afford “meaningful
review” of parole board decisions as they currently exist.200
In summary, arbitrary decision making and the lack of
procedural norms raise questions about the quality of decisions
and contributed to the waning use of parole boards by states.201
Use of parole eventually fell into disfavor as the public
demanded truth in sentencing and grew to mistrust the parole
process.202 Many states have limited the decision-making role of
parole boards so that the length of a prisoner’s sentence is more
frequently determined at the front end of sentencing.203 This
approach embraces finality at sentencing.204 The criticisms
levelled over time raise questions about whether the current
195 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16-18. (stating the basic minimum requirements
for parole release).
196 See, e.g., N.M. CODE R. § 22.510.2.8(A)(3) (2001); In re McCarthy, 164 P.3d
1283, 1288 (Wash. 2007) (holding that even though a statute requiring review hearings
for sex offenders created a limited liberty interest, “due process requires that offenders
have minimum procedural protections[, but that u]nder Greenholtz, these protections
do not include the right to counsel”); Russell, supra note 178, at 402-03.
197 Russell, supra note 178, at 402-03.
198 See, e.g., In re Hill, 827 N.W.2d 407, 417 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
199 See Russell, supra note 178, at 434 (reporting survey results about parole
board presence by inmates by video or in person). For examples of states that allow the
applicant to appear at parole hearings, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-411(B) (2012); CAL
PENAL CODE § 3041.5(a)(2) (2010); IND. CODE § 11-13-3-3(i)(3) (2012); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 217.690(2) (2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 508.141(c) (2013); see also Erin Lange
Ramamurthy, Comment, The Iron Curtain: Alabama’s Practice of Excluding Inmates
from Parole Release Hearings and Its Flawed Underpinnings, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1201, 1202-03 (2013) (citing author’s personal correspondence with
parole board personnel). The Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles’ regular practice
excludes parole applicants from appearing at their parole hearings because they are
conducted off site. Lange, supra note 199, at 1203. The comment argues that the
practice is a due process violation. Id. at 1204
200 Reitz, supra note 192, at 285.
201 Petersilia, supra note 24, at 124; Rhine, supra note 15, at 630-31 (discussing
the rapid dismantling of parole systems by many states and accompanying criticisms).
202 PETERSILIA, supra note 24, at 139 (describing “truth in sentencing” reform).
203 “Legislatures nationwide embraced determinate sentencing laws that called
for prison sentences for most offenses and required very lengthy prison terms for all
serious offenses and for all repeat offenders.” Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness,
Fairness, and Finality for Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 151, 162 (2014).
204 Id. at 165.
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parole processes in many states meet Graham’s application of
the Eighth Amendment.205 But they do not foreclose the chance
that they could with different criteria and procedures in place.
B. Sentencing Modification and Juvenile Sentencing
Reform
As the field develops, sentencing modification may prove
itself to be more favorable to legislators than the current debate
contemplates. For example, just recently, in Florida, where
Graham arose, legislators chose judicial sentencing modification
instead of reinstallation of parole in their compliance
legislation.206 Florida tends to impose harsh sentences on its
juvenile offenders, currently housing the highest number of
juvenile offenders to which Graham is directly applicable. And it
quickly generated numerous cases about juvenile offenders
serving lengthy term-of-years sentences.207 Additionally, it
houses the second largest number of offenders serving life
sentences in the country, many of whom are juveniles.208
The American Law Institute acknowledges that a
resentencing or “second look” model for release creates “new
institutional arrangements for prison-release decisions that
have not been tested in practice.”209 Scholars alike have noted
the potential utility of second look sentencing in place of parole,
along with the potential drawbacks.210 The Code’s proposed
sentencing revision uses a determinate sentencing structure. It
includes sentencing modification both for juveniles and adults
serving lengthy sentences.211 Assigning this function to the
judiciary, as opposed to parole boards, is consistent with the
Code’s general philosophy that sentencing is purely a “judicial
function;” it acknowledges that the release decision is more
closely related to sentencing than it is to correctional decision
205 See generally Russell, supra note 178 (exploring whether state parole
processes meet Graham’s application of the Eighth Amendment).
206 FLA. STAT. § 921.1402 (2014).
207 See, e.g., Guzman v. State, 110 So. 3d 480, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)
(holding that Graham did not apply where juvenile received a sixty year sentence
because it did not qualify as a life sentence or a de facto one); see also Schlessel, supra
note 52, at 1038-57.
208 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 2, at 6.
209 MODELPENALCODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
210 See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love & Cecelia Klingele, First Thoughts about
“Second Look” and Other Sentence Reduction Provisions of the Model Penal Code:
Sentencing Revision, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 859, 861 (2011) (describing questions raised
such as potential conflicts with indeterminancy and whether it may “even encourage
judges to impose longer sentences in the first instance”).
211 MODELPENALCODE: SENTENCING § 6.06(4)-(5) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
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making.212 But as the Code draft notes, as of 2011 when it was
written, “[n]o provision closely similar to [the proposed
sentencing modification] exists in any American jurisdiction.”213
That is, until now.
To some extent, therefore, an approach like Florida’s
creates unchartered waters for judges. That reality argues in
favor of requiring a right to counsel and related procedural
formalities and for providing clear guidance for consideration by
the judiciary. Judges issue sentencing decisions as a primary
function, but they do so at a fixed point in time that occurs
shortly after conviction—not twenty or thirty years later. In
large part, their decisions are based upon the seriousness of the
crime and are within a range that is often prescribed by the
legislature.214 As Professor Douglas Berman discusses, in reality,
the judicial role in the evaluation of offender characteristics is
often limited by current sentencing philosophies and mandatory
minimums.215 When they are able to consider age, it seems to
work against the juveniles. For example, the Supreme Court
“treated youthfulness as a categorical mitigating factor, [but]
many trial judges treat it as an aggravating factor when they
sentence juvenile murderers.”216 Graham’s focus on lessened
culpability, redemption, and rehabilitation seems to contrast
with that data.
In states where sentencing remains indeterminate,
inmate release is primarily left to parole boards and judicial
review is not the traditional method for release decisions that
are made post-sentencing.217 Moreover, some sentencing
212 Id. § 305.6 cmt. d.
213 Id. § 305.6 cmt. a.
214 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender
Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 281 (2005). For
example, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 states that, among other reasons,
sentences should be crafted to reflect the seriousness of the crime and promote just
punishment for the crime. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012). Similarly, while states employ
differing models, the MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING describes the relative shares of
discretion over prison terms held by sentencing courts, parole boards, and corrections
officials under the indeterminate sentencing structure advocated in the original Model
Penal Code, demonstrating the lower portion given to the judiciary. MODEL PENAL
CODE: SENTENCING § 6.06 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
215 Berman, supra note 214, at 281. “The new sentencing philosophies and
goals reflected in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory sentencing
statutes have emphasized offense conduct at sentencing and have limited judges’
opportunity to consider offender characteristics.” Id.
216 Feld, supra note 53, at 130.
217 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2011) (noting that in most states, the judicial authority to reconsider a sentence expires
within months after sentencing); cf. Reginald A. Wilkinson et. al., Prison Reform
Through Offender Reentry: A Partnership Between Courts and Corrections, 24 PACE L.
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structures give prosecutors significant power over sentencing
and release which serves to decrease judicial authority to
consider individual characteristics as the norm.218
Next, it is often suggested that the judiciary may be more
insulated from public criticism than the highly politicized
process of parole administration.219 On the other hand, judicial
selection still occurs through elections in many states.220 Elected
judges are less insulated from the political repercussions of their
decisions.221 In addition, even in jurisdictions without judicial
elections, judicial reappointment and retention can be
threatened by decisions that are politically unpopular.222 These
pressures could make a judge standing alone reticent to exercise
the authority to release despite a meritorious application,
particularly with a highly discretionary standard. The use of
judicial panels and appellate review of the decisions can provide
accountability and offset some of the potential weaknesses.223
Third, sentencing proceedings typically afford more
procedural rights224 than parole release proceedings; although
sentencing rights still remain “notoriously inadequate.”225 Where
REV. 609, 618 (2004) (discussing the judicial role in reentry in the context of drug
courts and noting that in general “[c]ourts have traditionally played a marginal role in
the process of offender reentry”).
218 Douglas Berman, Encouraging (and Even Requiring) Prosecutors to Be
Second-Look Sentencers, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 429, 430 (2010) (discussing
the power of prosecutors as “first look” sentencers particularly under mandatory
minimum schemes); Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1340 (2005) (noting that
“increasing the complexity of a sentencing guidelines system tends to confer power on
prosecutors while limiting the power of judges”).
219 See Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth:
Judicial Sentence Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 465, 498 (2010) (proposing that judicial gatekeeping in early release programs is
desirable because there is less political pressure on judges than parole boards).
220 For a complete list of judicial selection methods, see AM. BARASS’N., FACT SHEET
ON JUDICIAL SELECTIONMETHODS IN THE STATES 1, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckdam.pdf.
221 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, § 305.6 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2011) (noting the reality that “judges in some jurisdictions are more politically
vulnerable than in others”); see also supra note 220.
222 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. d (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011).
223 For example, the MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011) suggests discretionary appellate review and issuance of guidelines
by a sentencing authority.
224 Reitz, supra note 192, at 283; see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING,
§ 305.6 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
225 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING app. B (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011); see
Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 523, 548 (1993); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick,
Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 57 (2011)
(critiquing lack of constitutional rights at sentencing and noting that “courts have
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states choose sentencing modification proceedings for juvenile
offender review for release, it is more likely that the minimum
rights typically afforded at sentencing will be present.226 But it
may not be automatic. If states strip these features from the
process in the juvenile release context, it will minimize the
perceived benefits of judicial sentencing modification. In
Delaware, the legislation did not address the inclusion of these
rights.227 Upon consideration of retroactive cases, however, it
appears that courts have proceeded by adhering to sentencing
norms at least in cases.
Fourth, judicial sentencing modification places the
decision making primarily within one institution.228 An
approach favoring judicial authority over sentencing-related
decisions would view this as the most principled path.229 At the
same time, there are compelling arguments that a release
process benefits when there is institutional balance. For
example, Professor Richard Bierschbach notes that the parole
board serves as an institutional balance in the incarceration
process at the back-end of sentencing.230 He analogizes it to
Apprendi’s role in balancing between the jury and the judiciary
in sentencing on the front-end but also acknowledges its
deficiencies.231 On the other hand, he acknowledges that in its
current form, the ability of the parole board to provide more
fairness and accountability may be more of an aspiration than
a reality. Moreover, it is important to note that in some states,
the judge can override the parole board anyway,232 diminishing
the efficacy of the balance.
There is a second point related to the balance of power
that is unique to the juvenile context: judges often make the
decision to transfer a juvenile into adult court which is also
relevant here in two ways.233 First, juvenile transfer plays a
repeatedly permitted the consideration of a number of constitutionally doubtful
sentencing factors”).
226 See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 52, at 55.
227 See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text (explaining Delaware’s
statute and related rules).
228 However, it is important to note that “the modern administration of
criminal justice systems can often exacerbate the power imbalance that makes
prosecutors the only significant sentencing actor in many non-capital cases.” Berman,
supra note 218, at 433.
229 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
230 See Bierschbach, supra note 14, at 1780-81. The parole board, Professor
Bierschbach posits, “injects an additional check into the sentencing process by
fragmenting authority among different institutional actors.” Id. at 1780.
231 Id.
232 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.234(11) (2010).
233 Feld, supra note 1, at 472.
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critical role in cases where juveniles are sentenced as adults.234
Judicial waiver is the most widely used mechanism of
transfer.235 Under a typical state transfer statute, a judge is
authorized to waive juvenile court jurisdiction, although
sometimes, the prosecutor decides where the case will be filed
unless the legislature has specifically excluded the crime from
juvenile court jurisdiction.236 Usually, the judge holds a hearing
on the youth’s amenability to rehabilitation through the juvenile
delinquency system and the threat he may pose to public
safety.237 The transfer decision point is arguably even more
critical to sentencing than any other decision that follows it.238
Therefore, the judiciary would be responsible for the decision at
all three critical stages: transfer, sentencing, and modification.
Juvenile transfer is criticized for providing too much
discretion to judges and for lacking standards.239 Professor
Barry Feld has described the judicial transfer decision as an
“individualized sentencing decision” and describes criticisms
that the process leads to discriminatory and inconsistent
application.240 In most jurisdictions, it is exceedingly rare to
overturn a transfer decision. With the discretion comes the
danger for bias and unpredictability. Therefore, sentencing
modification procedures that lack sufficient substantive
guidance or standards leaves the process open to the same
criticisms traditionally leveled at the transfer hearing stage.
Based upon the philosophical and practical strengths and
weaknesses inherent in either method of review, judicial versus
administrative, new laws addressing juvenile sentencing reform
should include substantive decision-making standards and
include procedural requirements that will foster transparency
and consistency. Under either format of review, an assessment
of the risk posed by the former juvenile offender will occur and,
234 “A waiver decision is also a sentencing decision which represents a choice
between the punitive dispositions of adult criminal courts and the nominally
rehabilitative dispositions of the juvenile court.” Id.
235 Id. at 488. Depending on the format of the state statute, judges and
sometimes, prosecutors are empowered to make the transfer decision unless the
legislature has made transfer to adult court automatic for the crime at issue. Id.
236 Id.; id. n.75.
237 Id. at 488.
238 See, e.g., id. at 489-90 & n.80.
239 Id. at 489 (describing criticisms by proponents of just deserts in sentencing
which include the contention that there is no “valid or reliable clinical basis upon
which juvenile court judges can make accurate amenability or dangerousness
determinations and that the standardless discretion afforded to judges results in
inconsistent and discriminatory application”).
240 Id.
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therefore, states should ensure that the decision maker is armed
with reliable tools with which to make the decision.
III. GATEKEEPING AND RISK ASSESSMENT
A. The Rise of Validated Risk Assessment in Corrections
The difficulty in assessing or predicting risk of
dangerousness has always been an integral part of the
discussion of sentencing, parole, and incarceration, regardless
of the tools or lack of tools informing the judgment.241 Now,
actuarial risk assessment instruments are emerging as a
potentially powerful tool in carceral and criminal justice
policy.242 The Code’s proposal considers the use of credible risk
assessment tools as necessary for ethical and plausibility
reasons.243 The mainstream use of this type of risk assessment
instruments is fairly new. Their use is both welcome and
controversial.244 Some states now require their use by law
241 See JAMES Q. WILSON, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 279 (1983) (“The entire
criminal justice system is shot through at every stage (bail, probation, sentencing, and
parole) with efforts at prediction, and necessarily so . . . .”); Barbara D. Underwood,
Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and
Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1410 (1979) (discussing the lack of valid
predictive instruments during that time period and noting the prevalence of critics who
“contend that predictions of criminal behavior are not accurate enough to use as a basis
for a decision about a matter as important as liberty”).
242 Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra note 15, at 196-97 [hereinafter Risk Assessment]
(discussing the increasing role of formal risk assessment at sentencing); James Austin,
The Proper and Improper Use of Risk Assessment in Corrections, 16 FED. SENT’G REP.
194, 195 (2004) (noting that expanded use of risk assessment instruments is receiving
attention in literature and practice); Pari McGarraugh, Note, Up or Out: Why
“Sufficiently Reliable” Statistical Risk Assessment is Appropriate at Sentencing and
Inappropriate at Parole, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (2013) (describing the “continued
and accelerated use of risk assessment instruments” as inevitable); PAMELA CASEY ET
AL., NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, USING OFFENDER RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT
INFORMATION AT SENTENCING 1 (2011), available at http://www.ncsc.org/
~/media/Files/PDF/Services%20and%20Experts/Areas%20of%20expertise/Sentencing%
20Probation/RNA%20Guide%20Final.ashx (discussing the increased use of validated
risk and needs assessment instruments as a valuable tool in criminal justice decision
making); Joseph Walker, State Parole Boards Use Software to Decide Which Inmates to
Release, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304626104579121251595240852 (discussing the growing trend and
that, as a result, “[o]fficials accustomed to relying heavily on experience and intuition
when making parole rulings now find they also must take computerized inmate
assessments and personality tests into account”).
243 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.06(d) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
244 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary Goal of Sentencing:
The Modern Case for Indeterminate Dispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SANDIEGO L. REV.
1127, 1154 (2011) [hereinafter Prevention] (discussing reasons why probability estimates
involved with risk assessment can be flawed); Slobogin, Risk Assessment, supra note 242,
at 203-09 (discussing constitutional issues associated with actuarial risk assessment,
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either at sentencing or for parole release decision making.245
This includes three of the state’s housing the highest numbers
of juveniles sentenced to life, California, Louisiana, and
Michigan. The instruments have been incorporated in various
forms across jurisdictions at bail hearings, sentencing, parole
release, and to determine levels of parole supervision.246 Some
objections to their use are dependent upon the setting and
whether there is an opportunity to inspect them.247 Their
emergence means that they already play a significant role in
release decision making in the post-Graham and Miller era.
Graham reasons that juveniles have a greater capacity for
change and therefore, that it is difficult to impose an
appropriate sentence at one fixed point during childhood;248 as a
result, decision makers are tasked with assessment of risk at
some later fixed point.
The debate about actuarial risk assessment tools will
continue for some time and a complete discussion about their
strengths and weaknesses is beyond the scope of this Article.
Therefore, this analysis focuses on the most pressing
preliminary points about risk assessment tools and their role in
back end release in the juvenile sentencing reform context.
Given the increasing use of these tools in criminal justice,
actuarial risk assessment is relevant whether states choose
“second look” sentencing or parole review for juveniles who are
sentenced as adults.
Risk assessment in the context of juvenile offenders is
not new. In the past, there has been discussion about the
potential judicial use of risk assessment instruments at
transfer hearings to determine whether juveniles should be
tried adult court.249 But their use in that context did not take
along with methodological and evidentiary concerns); Christopher Slobogin, The
Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 151 (2005) (pointing out that
“risk assessment methods[ ] have improved immensely over the past few decades”); Sonja
B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination,
66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805 (2014) (critiquing the use of risk assessment instruments at
sentencing based upon constitutional and policy grounds).
245 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-1-412(a) (2014) (requiring the use of
validated risk assessment instruments at sentencing); Walker, supra note 242
(describing that at least fifteen states have required their use by corrections decisions
in some capacity).
246 CASEY ET AL., supra note 242, at 1.
247 See generally McGarraugh, supra note 242 (discussing why the use of risk
assessment instruments is favorable at sentencing by courts but problematic in the
parole release setting); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a
248 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 77 (2010).
249 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of
Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 997 (1995) (discussing
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root. Their use and application to this unique juvenile offender
population that has or will age into adulthood while imprisoned
for long sentences creates new questions.
Generally, risk assessment techniques are divided into
three larger categories: “[U]nstructured clinical assessment,
actuarial assessment, and structured professional judgment.”250
Research has shown that actuarial risk assessment and
structured professional judgment are superior and less
arbitrary than individual clinical assessment.251 Such tools
contribute consistency and predictability, removing
arbitrariness from the decision-making process.252 They
produce “an objective estimate of violence risk” based upon
statistical relationships between individual risk factors and
criminal behavior.253 Actuarial risk assessment instruments
themselves are also divided into three groups: those that are
based upon static factors, those based upon dynamic factors,
and a “third generation” type that is based upon both static and
dynamic factors along with professional judgment.254 Static
factors are those that cannot change, such as age at first arrest
and employment history before incarceration.255 Dynamic
factors consider behavior that can change over time and are
“situational in nature.”256 Dynamic factors can include attitude
and educational attainment. This Article focuses on the third
recommendations in the early 1990s for the use of objective “risk assessment”
instruments during juvenile transfer hearings). Professor Feld noted that, at that time,
the issue was left unresolved. Id. For a discussion of best practices related to risk
assessment in the juvenile justice system, see GINA M. VINCENT ET AL, NAT’L YOUTH
SCREENING & ASSESSMENT PROJECT, RISK ASSESSMENT IN JUVENILE JUSTICE: A
GUIDEBOOK FOR IMPLEMENTATION 7 (2012), available at http://www.nysap.us/
Risk%20Guidebook.pdf (explaining that the majority of research around risk
assessment in juvenile justice has been done in the context of probation).
250 Slobogin, Risk Assessment, supra note 242, at 198.
251 Id. at 200 (stating that more recent studies involving actuarial risk assessment
and structured professional judgment “tend to produce much lower false positive rates” than
unstructured evaluation); Austin, supra note 242, at 196 (discussing the increased accuracy
of actuarial risk assessment tools); Stephen D. Gottfredson & Laura J. Moriarty, Statistical
Risk Assessment: Old Problems and New Applications, 52 CRIME&DELINQ. 178, 180 (2006)
(concluding that predictions using clinical assessment “have not been found to be accurate,”
and that actuarial risk assessment “has been found to outperform human judgments” in
“virtually all decision-making situations”).
252 John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm
Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 408-09 (2006).
253 Id. at 405-06.
254 See D.A. Andrews et al., The Recent Past and Near Future of Risk and/or
Need Assessment, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 7-8 (2006); Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based
Sentencing: The Application of Principles of Evidence-Based Practice to State
Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 603 (2009).
255 Austin, supra note 242, at 196-97.
256 Id. at 196.
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generation category that uses static and dynamic factors, and
is considered more accurate than other tools.257
Two of the most widely adopted risk assessment tools in
the criminal justice setting are Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (Compas) and
Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R).258 For example,
Michigan and California parole boards use Compas.259 Compas,
and other computerized tools like it, analyze up to one hundred
factors about an offender to determine risk level.260 Factors
considered in risk assessment include both static and dynamic
factors about the offender.261 Longitudinal studies about
offenders identify attributes associated with risk of recidivism
to form the basis of the factors.262 These factors then create a
numeric risk score.263 One advantage is that the use of
validated actuarial instruments allows for the consideration of
a broad range of variables in a systematic manner.
Their successful implementation relies heavily on the
design, the type of information that is entered into the tool, and
the training of those who administer it.264 Their influence is
also largely dependent upon the user to determine the relevant
threshold of acceptable risk.265 For example, the tool provides a
generally suggested range that should guide a decision maker,
but the decision-making entity must assign that cut off score
and exercise discretion. The tools do not, therefore, fully
supplant human judgment.
Nearly every state uses a risk assessment tool for at
least one point of decision in corrections.266 The majority of
parole boards now use some type of risk assessment
instrument according to a national survey from 2008.267
257 Warren, supra note 254, at 603.
258 James Austin, How Much Risk Can We Take? The Misuse of Risk
Assessment in Corrections, 70 FED. PROBATION 58, 60 (2006).
259 See In re Elias, 811 N.W.2d 541, 548 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the
use of COMPAS by the Michigan parole board).
260 Id; see also Walker, supra note 242 (quoting one of the creators of
COMPAS about its design).
261 Shelley L. Brown et al., The Dynamic Prediction of Criminal Recidivism: A
Three-Wave Prospective Study, 33 LAW&HUM. BEHAV. 25, 25 (2008).
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 McGarraugh, supra note 242, at 1093.
265 Id. at 1094. “Risk instruments themselves do not necessarily resolve
downstream policy choices of determining meaningful cutoffs in risk scores.” Id.
266 Memorandum from the Vera Institute of Justice, Center on Sentencing and
Corrections, to the Delaware Justice Reinvestment Task Force 4 (Oct. 12, 2011),
available at http://ltgov.delaware.gov/taskforces/djrtf/DJRTF_Risk_Assessment_Memo.pdf.
267 SUSAN C. KINNEVY& JOELM. CAPLAN, CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON YOUTH& SOC.
POL’Y, FINDINGS FROM THE APAI INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF RELEASING AUTHORITIES 1,
156 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1
Actuarial risk assessment has also been incorporated into
various stages of judicial decision-making.268 Moreover, a
survey of chief judges in state courts administered by the
National Center for State Courts revealed that the judiciary
views the incorporation of risk assessment tools as desirable
and among the most important sentencing reform priorities.269
Finally, the Model Penal Code’s draft sentencing provisions
employ a determinate sentencing model and suggest that
validated risk assessment instruments should be used at the
sentencing stage, as well.270
The use of actuarial risk assessment instruments by
parole boards and judges has direct applicability to the current
discussions about juvenile sentencing reform under Graham
and Miller. Some state laws require the parole board to use
them, including three of the states that house the largest
numbers of juvenile lifers. For example, California’s Board of
Parole uses actuarial risk assessment tools and is now required
to use them for juvenile offender release decisions.271 Louisiana
similarly requires the use of a validated risk assessment
instrument in its Graham compliance legislation.272 In
(2008), available at http://paroleboard.arkansas.gov/Resources/Documents/Publications/
2008APAISurvey.pdf (reporting that a national survey found that 87% of parole
releasing authorities reported using a risk assessment tool). It should be noted, however,
that the survey did not specify whether these are the newer form of actuarial software
programs. Id. It has been reported that the types of tools that states use vary from manual
checklists to computerized actuarial programs. See Tammy Meredith, et al., Developing and
Implementing Automated Risk Assessments in Parole, 9 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2007).
California and New York have both adopted Compas. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB.,
CAL. RISK ASSESSMENT FACT SHEET, available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/
rehabilitation/docs/FS_COMPAS_Final_4-15-09.pdf; Walker, supra note 242.
268 CASEY ET AL., supra note 242, at 1; Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based
Sentencing: Are We Up to the Task?, 23 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 153, 157 (2010) (noting that as
of 2010, there were at least ten states where sentencing judges use risk assessment
instruments); McGarraugh, supra note 242, at 1090.
269 Warren, supra note 254, at 587 (noting that a recent survey conducted by
the National Center for State Courts found that state chief justices believed that
among the two most important sentencing reform objectives are promotion of public
safety and reduced recidivism through expanded use of evidence-based practices, and
offender risk and needs assessment tools); see, e.g., Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based
Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety Through State Sentencing Reform, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1408 (2008) (discussing why risk assessment is an appropriate
and desirable tool for those involved in sentencing).
270 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
Because the revised code advances the use of a determinative sentencing scheme, there
would not be an occasion for a parole releasing authority to do so. Id.
271 S.B. 260, 2013 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
272 LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.2(C)(2)(f) (2012) (requiring that the offender
obtains a score indicating low risk through a validated risk assessment instrument).
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Michigan, the Parole Board policies already required use of
validated risk assessment instruments in parole decisions.273
Thus far, state reforms using “second look” sentencing
modification, placing judges in the decision-making role, have
not formally required the use of risk assessment instruments
in the legislation. Florida’s legislation permits its use among
the suggested factors for court consideration without requiring
it;274 In Delaware, the court rules promulgated in relation to
Miller permit the judge to request that the Department of
Corrections specifically certify that the offender does not pose a
substantial risk to the community.275 However, the Delaware
statute and rules are silent as to the basis for the Department
certification and the court’s subsequent decision.276
While the use of actuarial risk assessment is viewed as
potentially beneficial, there are legitimate questions about the
current capacity for use with this population. To ensure
accuracy, best practices dictate that jurisdictions must ensure
that the instruments are valid and tested based upon the
populations to which they will be applied.277 This point has
particular application where, as here, a small subset of
prisoners is concerned; the number of inmates who are
incarcerated in their teens and go on to serve lengthy sentences
in prison in any given community is statistically small.
Additionally, research has shown that such instruments have
typically been developed using a white male population and for
one widely used instrument, the males were Canadian.278
Therefore, despite some of the advantages, there are
limitations, including many untested aspects of these
assessments in practice.279 Nevertheless, the limitations can be
minimized by ensuring the chosen instrument is reliable and
valid and ensuring that it is administered properly.280
In short, risk assessment instruments are problematic
when they are used “on populations for which they were not
273 See In re Elias, 811 N.W.2d 541, 548 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the
Michigan parole process in detail and its policy to use the COMPAS risk assessment tool).
274 FLA. STAT. § 921.1402 (2014).
275 DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 35A (d)(1).
276 Id.
277 Gottfredson & Moriarty, supra note 251, at 185 (stating that
“samples . . . must be representative of the population on which the device is intended
to be used”); McGarraugh, supra note 242, at 1093.
278 Slobogin, Risk Assessment, supra note 242, at 207-08.
279 Slobogin, Prevention, supra note 244, at 1154 (discussing common
criticisms of actuarial risk assessment instruments).
280 Austin, supra note 242, at 196-97.
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designed.”281 There are no instruments in use that have
currently been tested upon this unique population. Risk
assessment instruments can benefit criminal justice decision
making in significant ways.282 But states may find themselves
in a “catch twenty-two” where they are required by law to use
actuarial risk assessment instruments on a population for
which there is not yet an appropriate instrument.283
Next, literature suggests that when actuarial risk
assessment instruments are used in criminal justice, the
person assessed should have counsel and an opportunity to
examine the instrument’s application, for example, at a
hearing.284 Under current law, offenders in many states do not
receive a public parole hearing.285 In addition, only a few states
provide for the appointment of counsel at parole hearings.286
Finally, depending on the jurisdiction, the factors used
to assess risk level include commonly considered
characteristics, such as whether the offender is married, age at
arrest, past employment, education, and assessment of the
applicant’s attitude.287 The application of those factors to this
juvenile population is misplaced. The next two subsections
consider certain factors used in risk assessment decisions that
deserve close attention considering their effect on the risk
scores of juvenile offenders serving lengthy sentences.
B. Age and Risk Assessment
Under Graham and Miller, the youth of the offender is
viewed as a factor suggesting a greater likelihood of
redemption.288 Yet, in parole release risk assessment, age
generally works to increase the potential risk scores of those
who offend at a young age. For example, age at the time of
offense typically elevates the level of risk associated with that
281 Gottfredson & Moriarty, supra note 251, at 190; see also Slobogin, Risk
Assessment, supra note 242, at 208.
282 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2011) (stating that social science research supports the conclusion that actuarial
risk assessment instruments are superior to clinical judgments overall).
283 Even before California implemented juvenile release reform, its previous
actuarial instrument received criticism for its lack of empirical support. Slobogin, Risk
Assessment, supra note 242, at 208.
284 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No.
2, 2011); McGarraugh, supra note 242, at 1106.
285 Russell, supra note 178, at 421.
286 Id.
287 Slobogin, Risk Assessment, supra note 242, at 198-99 (discussing commonly
used risk assessment tools and the factors that they include to measure level of risk).
288 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464-65 (2012).
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offender.289 On the one hand, the offender’s youth makes him
less blameworthy and less culpable for his actions because he
has a greater potential for change;290 on the other hand, data
driven risk assessment instruments are based upon empirical
evidence suggesting that early onset of criminal or delinquent
activity correlates with a greater likelihood of future criminal
behavior.291 As a result, the age at arrest is a common
consideration in risk assessment and is usually among static
factors that are considered to make release decisions. In that
way, a minor’s young age at the time of the crime underlying
the conviction increases his risk level.
Age is considered in a variety of ways during the parole
review process. Age can fall in both the dynamic and static
categories of factors. In the static category of factors, some
states consider the age at the time of the triggering offense,292
and others take into account the age at first arrest.293 For
example, applicants would receive increased points in their risk
scores based upon youth at first arrest or youth at the time of
arrest for the current conviction.294 In a survey of parole
releasing authorities, administrators were asked to rate on a
scale of one to five, with five being the most impactful, how
much certain factors impacted their decision.295 While crime
severity and crime type were most influential in this survey,
the consideration of “age . . . at time of the crime” was also
ranked high in impact.296 The current age of the offender is a
289 See, e.g., Slobogin, Risk Assessment, supra note 242, at 198 (discussing the
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) and its inclusion of age at the time of the
triggering offense as a risk factor).
290 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
291 Austin, supra note 242, at 197 tbl.5 (listing risk factors that predict
recidivism, including early age at first arrest).
292 See, e.g., Slobogin, Risk Assessment, supra note 242, at 198 (discussing the
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) and its inclusion of age at the time of the
triggering offense as a risk factor).
293 Austin, supra note 242, at 197 tbl.5 (listing risk factors that predict
recidivism, including early age at first arrest); see, e.g., SHARON LANSING, NEW YORK
STATE COMPAS-PROBATION RISK AND NEED ASSESSMENT STUDY: EXAMINING THE
RECIDIVISM SCALE’S EFFECTIVENESS AND PREDICTIVE ACCURACY 2 (2012) (including age
at first arrest among New York’s COMPAS based considerations).
294 For example, in Nevada, an applicant’s risk score increases two points if
the current conviction occurred before the person was nineteen. See Nevada
Department of Corrections Risk Assessment Form [hereinafter Risk Assessment Form]
(on file with author).
295 KINNEVY&CAPLAN, supra note 267, at 18-19.
296 Id. at 18-19. While that survey did not delineate in what way it impacted
the decision maker, age at arrest generally was included as a heightened risk factor.
For example, review of available state instruments that include age at the time of the
offense demonstrates that commission of the crime at a younger age weighs against the
release of the offender. See, e.g., Risk Assessment Form, supra note 294.
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dynamic factor which appears to be a standard consideration
among release decision makers; that is because, generally, the
risk that a prisoner will reoffend diminishes over time.
Therefore, the risk score associated with an inmate’s current
age decreases over time.
Because age at first arrest and age at the time of the
current offense are both static factors, they will continue to
weigh against the prior juvenile offender’s application for
release. To illustrate how this plays out in practice, consider
Nevada’s risk scoring process. Of Nevada’s prisoners serving
parole eligible life sentences, twelve percent of them committed
their crimes as juveniles.297 That is the highest percentage of
any state.298 In Nevada, an offender’s risk score increases by
two points if he committed the crime for which he is
incarcerated when he was under age nineteen.299 In
comparison, he may receive a one point risk reduction if he
completes an employment or education program that is
certified by the state department of corrections.300 Therefore,
program completion does not fully mitigate the impact of his
early age of arrest.
C. Other Risk Assessment Factors and Their Impact on
Juvenile Offenders
Next, it is common for risk assessment to consider
former employment history and even marital status.301 Like
age, these factors will weigh against the risk score for a
juvenile offender who will be unlikely to demonstrate a
significant work history or marital relationship. Using Nevada
again as an example, a male who is arrested as a teenager with
no employment history, and some history of alcohol or drug
abuse, will score a six in the static factors in Nevada’s risk
assessment form thus placing him as a mid-level risk.302 This is
regardless of his crime and the number of years that he has
served his sentence. One criticism in risk assessment is a
“heavy reliance on static variables to the exclusion, oftentimes,
of dynamic variables.”303 Tools or methods that leave out
297 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 2, at 12.
298 Id.
299 Risk Assessment Form, supra note 294.
300 Id.
301 Slobogin, Risk Assessment, supra note 242, at 198-99.
302 Risk Assessment Form, supra note 294.
303 Gottfredson & Moriarty, supra note 251, at 191.
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dynamic factors alter the process for this class of offenders
given the way that the static factors typically put them in a
high risk category. However, variables that reliably predict risk
cannot be disregarded; demanding more attention to the
question is warranted.304
On the whole, there is a disconnect between the life of a
juvenile and some traditional risk factors. States should reconsider
the ways in which they will calculate risk for juveniles serving
lengthy sentences to acknowledge the differences between a person
who became incarcerated as an adult versus as a child.305 Graham
andMiller require a decision maker to clearly assign weight to the
role of age in release consideration and they need guidance about
how to do it. “A parole board’s job is to implement policy, not create
it, but without clear policy guidance, board decisions will
themselves effectively establish state policy.”306 If not properly
guided, the system of review runs the risk of perpetuating the
status quo which does not adhere to the underlying premise in
Graham—namely that commission of crime at a young age does
not leave one without the possibility of rehabilitation.
IV. JUVENILEOFFENDER RELEASEDECISIONMAKING
Whether the judiciary or administrative parole board
functions as the official gatekeeper for eventual release, the
process should provide clear guidance about the substance of
decisions and procedural norms. The process should include the
careful consideration of implementation of actuarial risk
assessment instruments, procedural requirements that will
facilitate transparency and quality of decisions, and clarity
about the rationale and basis for the development of offender
release policies. Finally, opportunities for review should not be
waivable in bargaining at the plea stage. A right to review for
release is consistent with the recognition that the actions of
juveniles “are less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably
depraved character’” than are the actions of adults.307
304 See also Slobogin, Risk Assessment, supra note 242, at 204-05 (discussing
additional constitutional and philosophical issues associated with the consideration of
a range of risk factors such as age, gender, employment, and education status).
305 Cf. id. at 205-06 (noting that official use of age, marital status, and
employment “may disproportionately taint” young, single, unemployed males “in the
eyes of parole officers who make risk assessments, police officers who make arrests,
and the public at large”).
306 W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 395, 405 (2011).
307 Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
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A. Substantive Criteria
Laws should provide clear criteria for decision makers
about how to account for the hallmarks of youth to inform the
gatekeeping function. Miller provides a prescriptive list of
factors that courts can consider during the individual
sentencing hearings. But it is less clear how to account for age
on the back end of release decision making. Early results in
California are instructive because it has provided for
retroactive consideration of most juvenile offenders with
lengthy sentences. Therefore, it mirrors what is to come in
future decades. Results there suggest that the effect of the
specific criteria and rationale focused on development in the
legislation, in tandem with a politically favorable environment,
has been impactful.308 In the first group of offenders that the
parole board considered between the effective date of S.B. 260
and February 2014, twelve out of twenty-one applicants were
granted a parole release date.309 These results stand in stark
contrast when compared to the annual rates of decisions
granting parole release to life sentenced offenders in California
in prior years—which in some years was as low as zero percent.
A lawsuit against the state that required a reduction of
California’s prison population310 created a climate less hostile to
new release policies. But some people involved with reform on
the ground acknowledge that the lawsuit and court order to
reduce the prison population alone would not have led to the
same result for juvenile offenders; the instruction in the
legislation that decision makers must give great weight to the
age of the offender provided specific and necessary guidance to
the parole board.311 Other state legislatures have employed
similar criteria and rationales in their juvenile sentencing
reform proposals, both for parole release and judicial
sentencing modification.312
In contrast to these examples, Iowa’s legislation made no
changes to the release decision making criteria for parole boards
when they consider release of those who were committed as
308 Interview with Elizabeth Calvin, Human Rights Watch (Feb. 18, 2014)
(notes on file with author).
309 Id.
310 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
311 Interview with Elizabeth Calvin, supra note 308.
312 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.1402(6)(a), (b), (e), (g); H.B. 2116, 2014 Leg. Sess.
(Haw. 2014); H.B. 4210, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014).
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juveniles.313 Similarly, Louisiana’s changes were minimal and
did not provide specific requirements about the administration
of the required risk assessment instrument by the parole board.
314 Reform should tailor the factors used for release
consideration. For example, the use of traditional indicators
such as employment history, marital status, and educational
achievement prior to incarceration have less meaning and erect
artificial barriers when they are applied to a person who would
not have had an opportunity to participate in those social
institutions before incarceration purely because of young age.
Next, parole boards often report basing release decisions
upon the triggering offense.315 One state study found that the
nature of the underlying offense was the primary reason that
judges gave when they exercised their judicial veto of parole.316
The triggering offense will always be in the foreground; but if it
is used as the exclusive reason to deny parole or sentencing
modification, then there is no opportunity for “demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.”317 The severity of the offense will
already have been considered, rightly so, at sentencing.
Finally, implementation of validated risk assessment
instruments should be carefully considered to improve fairness
and quality of decision making. Their use may allow for policy
and decision makers to better address the public’s concerns
about safety by informing the release decision. For example,
California’s law not only provides criteria for the parole board
but specifically addresses substance and procedure related to
risk assessment instruments.318 This is not the case in Michigan
or Louisiana. Its juvenile sentencing legislation is cognizant of
validated risk assessment use in two ways.319 First, it requires
that it must be administered by a licensed psychologist. Second,
the Act requires that the assessment instrument take into
account “hallmark features of youth and any subsequent growth
and increased maturity of the prisoner.”320 Florida’s new law
requires the judge to consider the results of “any mental health
313 IOWA CODE § 902.1(2)(a) (2011), invalidated by State v. Ragland, 836
N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013) (revising the number of years a defendant must serve before
becoming parole eligible); IOWA CODE § 906.5(3) (stating the relevant factors for
consideration) (2013).
314 See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
315 See Ball, supra note 306, at 397-98.
316 CITIZENS ALLIANCE, supra note 132, at 1.
317 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010).
318 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801 (West 2014).
319 California’s parole release system uses the Compas tool which has not yet
been tested upon this subset of offenders. CAL. DEP’T OFCORR. & REHAB., supra note 267.
320 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c).
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assessment, risk assessment, or evaluation of the juvenile
offender as to rehabilitation.”321 The judge is not guaranteed to
receive a risk assessment for decision-making purposes.
Use of a formal risk assessment by the judiciary is
consistent with the Model Penal Code’s proposed sentencing
provisions.322 Judges are in a unique procedural posture when
they are called to make a risk assessment decades after the
initial sentencing has occurred. Reviewing release fitness many
years after the original crime is a task which judges have not
traditionally been called upon to perform. Finally, if they are
utilized, actuarial risk assessment instruments should be
implemented in ways that maximize their accuracy and
predictability for this population.323
B. Procedure
Along with clear substantive criteria, meaningful review for
all lengthy sentences courts impose upon juvenile offenders must
include procedural due process.324 This includes the provision of
counsel, some form of a public hearing with a recorded decision,
and a notification process to those who become eligible. Finally, the
right to a second look hearing should not be waivable.
As a preliminary point, these minimal procedural
requirements do not necessarily impact release decision making
on their own. Consider California’s parole system more broadly:
it is one of the few states where offenders receive appointment of
counsel, public hearings, access to all non-confidential
documents, an explanation for the reasons of parole denial, and
a transcript of the hearing proceedings.325 Yet, release rates in
California have historically been quite low, fluctuating between
0% in some years to a high of 20%.326 Between 1999 and 2002,
the parole board held 12,000 release or “suitability” hearings;
out of those 12,000, the board found only 140 applicants suitable
for release.327 Of those 140 applicants, then-Governor Gray Davis
allowed two to be released on parole.328 In 2009, the parole board
321 FLA. STAT. § 921.1402 (2014) (emphasis added).
322 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a
323 Slobogin, Risk Assessment, supra note 242, at 207-08 (discussing some of
the ways that methodological and evidentiary concerns about the use of actuarial risk
assessment can be mitigated).
324 See Russell, supra note 178, at 421-28 (arguing that current state parole
processes do not provide a meaningful opportunity for release under Graham).
325 WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 45, at 8.
326 Id. at 4.
327 Ball, supra note 194, at 918.
328 Id.
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voted to release 8% of life sentenced offenders who were eligible
for a hearing.329 In 2013, the parole board voted to grant parole
release in about 14% of life sentenced offenders.330 That is the
highest percentage granted in recent years. Furthermore, the
deferential review standard and lack of required due process
rights makes the decisions nearly impossible to reverse.331
Therefore, procedural transparency alone cannot ensure
predictability or fairness. Yet, the effect of substantive
guidelines will be thwarted without any accompanying
procedural checks.
Public hearings would serve to increase transparency
and arguably address some of the mistrust in back end release
decisions that have hindered the process in the past.332 Second,
counsel is better equipped than offenders to ensure that a
review opportunity is meaningful by assisting in the
compilation of the applicant’s case, providing additional expert
information, and counseling the applicant about the process. In
Delaware, for example, early implementation of its retroactive
Miller statute has led to resentencing hearings that included
clinical expert testimony coordinated by special teams created
to work in preparation of the cases.333 As a result, the court had
a well-developed record to consider and the courts have granted
some applications for release.334 In some instances, prosecutors
and defenders were able to work out agreements in advance of
the hearing procedure.335 In the judicial context, the presence of
counsel better ensures the party’s case is correctly and fairly
represented.336 But it also avoids ethical pressures on judges
who must protect the pro se party’s rights while also seeking to
329 CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS, LIFER
SCHEDULER AND TRACKING SYSTEM FOR 2009, available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/
BOPH/docs/LSTS_Workload_CY2009.pdf (reporting that there were 6225 hearings and
the board voted to grant parole in 541 cases).
330 CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS, LIFER
SCHEDULER AND TRACKING SYSTEM FOR 2013, available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/
BOPH/docs/LSTS_Workload_CY2013.pdf (reporting that there were 4171 hearings and
the board voted to grant parole in 590 cases).
331 Ball, supra note 194, at 920, 958.
332 Cf. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L.
REV. 407, 445 (2008) (discussing the importance of transparency and legitimacy in the
criminal justice system).
333 Interview with Lisa Minutola, supra note 161.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Cf. Dan Gustafson et al., Pro Se Litigation and the Costs of Access to
Justice, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 32, 38 (2012) (“Viewed as a whole, the judges’
responses [to a judicial survey] suggest that both substantive and procedural problems
are common in pro se cases.”).
166 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1
be impartial.337 In addition, representation cuts back on
administrative stressors on the court that are often caused
when parties are not represented.338
Next, recorded decisions—whether judicial or
administrative—can contribute to better decision making.
Research has shown that requiring explanations of decisions can
diminish some forms of cognitive bias.339 In the judicial realm,
where use of judicial second look provisions creates a process
without analogue, it is arguably even more important to foster
access to related decisions. Consider one court in Wyoming: in
its decision following a resentencing hearing for a juvenile
offender under Miller, the court stated “while it is easy for the
appellate courts to list these factors and make a cookie cutter
approach to this, it’s never as easy to apply them to the actual
facts of this case.”340 Access among judges could promote
information sharing as courts venture into this newly created
territory.341 In addition, recorded decision making in criminal
justice can have a positive impact on the public’s perception of
legitimacy.342 Professor Cecelia Klingele argues that
compassionate release policies for aging and dying inmates
have faltered because of public backlash and misunderstanding
about the substance and methods of release procedures.343
Therefore, recorded decisions are equally desirable when the
337 “The evolving bench-bar debate over legal, procedural, and professional
dynamics in [pro se] cases highlights the ethical and political perils confronting judges who
work files with self-represented parties.” Honorable Annette J. Scieszinski, Not on My
Watch: One Judge’s Mantra to Ensure Access to Justice, 61 DRAKEL.REV. 817, 825 (2013).
338 Gustafson et al., supra note 336, at 37.
339 Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 475
(2009) (discussing in the sentencing context how “an explanation requirement has been
found, in and of itself, to diminish some forms of cognitive bias[,]” and the desirability
of such requirement to diminish decisions that are overly reliant on the federal
sentencing guidelines); see also Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 26-28 (2007) (describing the benefits of
explanations that form the basis of judicial decision making).
340 Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 136 (Wyo. 2014).
341 For a related discussion in the parole context, see, e.g., In re Elias, 811 N.W.2d
541, 543 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011). (“There is scant published caselaw analyzing the multipart
mechanics of Michigan’s current parole process. Consequently, circuit courts lack useful
precedent when called upon to review the propriety of a parole decision. We take this
opportunity to explain the elements culminating in a parole decision and offer guidance to
circuit courts confronted with a parole-decision challenge.”).
342 Norris, supra note 26, at 1610 (advocating recorded decision making in
another context on the theory that “transparency through logically explained and
publicly available decisions may make earned release systems more acceptable to the
public and, thus, more sustainable”); O’Hear, supra note 339, at 475-76; see also
Klingele, supra note 219, at 497-98.
343 Klingele, supra note 25, at 452-53 (noting, among other points, that
“[e]arly release failed in large part because of the allegation that release decisions were
‘secret’ and that they thwarted judicially-imposed sentences”).
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applicant’s request is granted. Finally, the benefits of actuarial
risk assessment instruments are more fully realized when
procedural safeguards accompany their use.344
Once a review procedure is created, it should not be subject
to plea bargaining. Consider Oregon, one of the only jurisdictions
with an existing pre-Graham second looking sentencing procedure
for juvenile offenders. Pressure at the plea bargaining stage to
waive the right to review arguably minimized its utility. There, the
second look provision does not apply to juveniles sentenced to
crimes among the most serious.345 Oregon’s law requires
mandatory minimums for crimes ranging from second degree
assault to homicide,346 precluding those individuals from relief
under the second look law. Most juveniles sentenced as adults,
therefore, were not eligible for relief; but even for those who were,
the second look measure was underutilized in part because of
waiver during plea agreements.347 When the legislature assigns a
right to judicial second look hearings, pressure to waive or
postpone the initial release review could ultimately render the
provisions meaningless.
C. Rationale and Public Legitimacy
The rationale underlying policy choices in juvenile
sentencing reform should be clearly stated and connected to
implementation with an eye toward increasing public legitimacy
and acceptance of less severe sentencing practices. This is true
for two reasons. First, in the absence of informed discourse,
juvenile justice policies are vulnerable to “distorted debates,
retributive tendencies and curtailing of children’s procedural
and substantive rights in the guise of safety and justice.”348 The
disconnect between perception and reality exacerbates the
344 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2011) (noting that the proposed revisions to the Code limit the use of validated risk
assessment instruments to sentencing where there is an opportunity to inspect them
and a constitutional right to counsel).
345 ZIEDENBERG ET AL., supra note 147, at 6, 60 (2011) (describing that only
youth convicted of crimes that do not fall under Measure 11 are eligible for Second
Look hearings). Oregon’s Measure 11 law requires mandatory minimums for crimes
ranging from second degree assault to homicide.
346 Id. at 6, 60; OR. REV. STAT. § 137.707 (2011).
347 ZIEDENBERG ET AL., supra note 147, at 60. (“The question of whether
prosecutors are using the leverage of the charging and plea process to take away a young
person’s opportunity for a Second Look is an issue of concern worthy of more study.”).
348 DON CIPRIANI, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND THE MINIMUM AGE OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY 124 (2009) (discussing how distorted realities impact the decision to
charge young children with crimes rather than handle the problem outside of the
criminal justice system).
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challenges for implementation of juvenile sentencing and release
reform, as distortions have in the past.349 Juvenile justice policy
has a long history of guidance by moral panic rather than by
design.350 Transfer of juveniles to adult court is one powerful
example of that.351
Second, historically the legal system tends to forgo
responsibility or hope of changing behavior of juveniles like
Terrance Graham. The public’s misperception about violent
crime and juveniles352 has, in part, served to abdicate a sense of
collective moral responsibility.353 Through isolation or
illumination of the least sympathetic aspects of the juvenile,
society is able to ignore the aspects of a juvenile’s life that
invoke “a desire to help,” which “serves to reinforce the severity
of public attitudes” to punish young offenders.354 In contrast,
Graham and Miller provide theoretical justifications for
reexamining application of the most severe punishments, as
well as, mandatory and lengthy sentences to juveniles. On a
deeper level, the premise contained within them, that juvenile
offenders may be less blameworthy than adults, challenges the
ability of the public to collectively forgo a sense of moral
responsibility.355 Therefore, it will be difficult to push against
that reality and implement change if the rationale for new
policies is not transparent to the public.356 Social psychology
research provides support for the principle that the public is
more willing to accept outcomes and accept legitimacy of
349 Cf. Feld, supra note 249, at 982 (describing the influence of mass media
coverage of juvenile crime and its influence the legislative process).
350 CIPRIANI, supra note 348, at 115-18; Susan Ruddick, Abnormal, the “New
Normal,” and Destabilizing Discourses of Rights, 18 PUB. CULTURE 53, 56 (2006).
351 Feld, supra note 249, at 966.
352 See CIPRIANI, supra note 348, at 115-18 (noting that since the late 1970s, there
has been a disconnect between “the successive moral panics over youth crime and the actual
levels of youth crime” in the United Kingdom and the United States); Lina Guzman et al.,
How Children Are Doing: The Mismatch Between Public Perception and Statistical Reality,
CHILD TRENDS RESEARCH BRIEF 1, 4 (2003) (illustrating that despite ten years of falling
rates of crime among youth and the lowest rates in twenty-five years, a national poll
revealed that sixty-six percent of adults believed that it had increased).
353 Cf. CIPRIANI, supra note 348, at 13.
354 Sanford J. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY. L.
REV. 659, 674 (1970).
355 CIPRIANI, supra note 348, at 15 (acknowledging that criminal law is “an
anodyne for the collective social conscience: if the criminal is morally responsible, then the
public is not, and any underlying collective moral responsibility remains out of sight”).
356 Cf. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of
Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 286 (2003) (noting that issues of process dominate the
public’s view of legitimacy of the courts, police, and social regulatory actions). “Studies
again suggest that the public is very sensitive to the manner in which authorities
exercise their authority—that is, to issues of procedural justice.” Id.
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decisions if they view the process as one that is fair.357 Relatedly,
“[w]hen the public is unwilling to give authorities the discretion
to make judgments, the actions of legal authorities are
constrained.”358 Moreover, transparency is recognized as a means
to improve public perception of legitimacy at various points of
the criminal justice process.359
Pennsylvania, Michigan, California, and Florida—all of
which have significant numbers of offenders directly affected
by Graham and Miller—provide examples of the significant
practical obstacles toward release reform. Pennsylvania has
the highest number of juvenile lifers and passed laws that test
the bare minimum of the Court’s requirements. Michigan has
the second highest number of juveniles serving mandatory life
sentences.360 It is estimated that it will cost the state $370
million to incarcerate the more than 300 offenders who are
serving mandatory life sentences they received as juveniles.361
But cost alone does not mitigate concern for public safety nor
does it address moral objections.362 For example, Michigan’s
elected Attorney General remains staunchly opposed to the
review release plan laid out in the federal court litigation.363
Moreover, the legislature opposes retroactive reconsideration of
its juveniles sentenced to mandatory life sentences.364
357 Id. at 292.
358 Id.
359 Cf. O’Hear, supra note 332, at 445 (arguing that increased transparency in
the plea bargaining setting could improve its perceived legitimacy); Victoria J.
Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole Boards, 45
S.C. L. REV. 567, 568 (1994).
360 See Human Rights Watch, State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving
Juvenile Life Without Parole, 1 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/
2009/10/02/state-distribution-juvenile-offenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole.
361 Study: Teen Life Terms Costly, THE DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 14, 2004,
available at 2004 WLNR 23096649.
362 Michael Tonry, Making Peace, Not a Desert, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
637, 637-38 (2011) (cost is not a primary concern for those who favor harsher
sentencing policies).
363 See Steve Carmody, Michigan Attorney General Appeals Order for Parole
Hearings for Teen Offenders Serving Life in Jail, MICHIGAN RADIO (Dec. 2, 2013, 2:20 PM),
http://michiganradio.org/post/michigan-attorney-general-appeals-order-parole-hearings-
teen-offenders-serving-life-jail.
364 S.B. 319, 2014 Mich. Legis. Serv., P.A. 22. This legislation does not apply
the new standard retroactively to the 350-360 current prisoners in this category. Id.
Instead, it includes a trigger provision so that it would be retroactive only if the
Supreme Court rules that is must apply retroactively. Id; see also David Eggert,
Michigan House OKs Sentencing Rules for Young Killers, DAILY TRIBUNE (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.dailytribune.com/government-and-politics/20140205/michigan-house-oks-
sentencing-rules-for-young-killers (describing the divisions by party lines about
whether to pass legislation that would allow retroactive application for current
inmates); Jonathan Oosting, Michigan Juvenile Lifers: House OKs ‘Retroactivity
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And yet, there is reason to believe in a public willingness to
consider well-reasoned policies that are “smart on crime.”365 In
California, obstacles gradually gave way to implementation of
reform that goes beyond the minimal requirements of Graham and
Miller. This was a result of a confluence of factors, including
community education and clarity about the underlying policy and
its purpose.366 It took six years and substantial advocacy by
proponents to achieve the passage of the first piece of the reform.
The legislation met with resistance for several years; but
eventually, its provisions, which balance safety concerns and
require offenders to earn their release, gained support.367 This
balanced approach coincided with government pressures to reduce
the prison population and eventually led to support from
unexpected sources on both sides of the aisle.368 In California’s
second piece of reform, the Graham rationale is included to direct
the parole board commissioners to give “great weight to diminished
culpability of juveniles.”369 People who favor more punitive
sentencing policies are swayed by moral justifications rather than
cost issues.370 Therefore, the force of Graham’s moral argument
about redemption and principled criteria for earning release may
speak more directly to those with moral objections to release.
Research demonstrates that victim input is often one of
the most impactful sources of information, aside from official
records of the inmate and the crime, in parole release decision
making.371 It is also a politically powerful voice that lawmakers
and prosecutors frequently cite in their opposition to release
policies that they perceive as going beyond the Court’s minimum
requirements.372 Therefore, it follows that proponents of reform
Trigger’ Leaving Most Convicts Behind Bars, MLIVE MEDIA GROUP (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/02/michigan_juvenile_lifers_house.html.
365 Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing and Corrections: Overlapping
and Inseparable Subjects, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS, supra note 15, at 3.
366 Calvin Presentation, supra note 112.
367 Paige St. John, Political Lines Drawn on Life Sentences for Teen Killers, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2012, 4:24 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-
politics/2012/09/politics-life-sentences-teen-killers.html (describing opposition from
Assembly Republican leader Connie Conway who described Senate Bill 9 as “unnecessary”).
368 See Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Giving Teen Offenders Chance at Parole is
Just, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, (Sept. 20, 2012 6:00 PM), http://www.utsandiego.com/
news/2012/sep/20/giving-teen-offenders-chance-at-parole-is-just/all/.
369 CAL PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (West 2014).
370 Tonry, supra note 362, at 637.
371 KINNEVY & CAPLAN, supra note 267, at 18. “The top three sources of input
considered by [releasing authorities] in their decision release process are from the
victim, the offender’s family and the district attorney.” Id. at 2.
372 Press Release, State of Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuettte, Schuette
Announces He Will Appeal Federal Court Ruling Opening Door for Parole for Teenage
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found the process of working with victims and families significant
to its passage and integrity, even in light of the state’s financial
and litigation considerations.373 Moreover, from a justice
standpoint, victims are central to the process because “people
value being treated with dignity and having their rights
acknowledged.”374
At the same time, California was under pressure to
reduce its prison population based upon a consent decree in
federal prison litigation.375 This pressure undoubtedly
decreased public and political hostility toward passage of
progressive juvenile release policies that go beyond the
minimum requirements dictated by the Supreme Court. In fact,
the Governor cited the state’s passage of juvenile sentencing
reform as evidence of the state’s good faith efforts to comply
with the court’s order.376 While California was engaged in
litigation specifically, many states face similar problems of
overcrowding and cost. But cost and overcrowding alone will
not win the support of the public and political constituencies.377
Reform must be carefully tailored and explicit about the moral
rationale that supports the substance of reform.378
Murderers, (Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-164-
46849-317347--,00.html. “In every case where a juvenile is sentenced to life in prison, a
victim was already sentenced to death—forever. The victim’s family then grapples with
the aftermath of post-traumatic stress, depression, unyielding grief and visits to a
grave.” Id.; see Clay Duda, California’s ‘Second Chance’ Bill Offers Hope for LWOP
Sentenced Youth, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (July 11, 2011), http://jjie.org/californias-
second-chance-bill-offers-hope-for-lwop-sentenced-youth (noting opposition from the
California District Attorneys Association which stated that Senate Bill 9 is
disrespectful to victims).
373 Interview with Elizabeth Calvin, supra note 308; see also Cecelia Klingele,
The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415, 458 (noting that political
will to make broad scale changes to carceral policy will only occur “if people believe
that they are fair to victims, offenders, and the larger community”).
374 Tyler, supra note 356, at 299.
375 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (upholding the lower court’s
decision requiring the state of California to reduce its prison population down to
137.5% of its design capacity).
376 Jesse Wegman, Op-Ed., Once Again, California Eases Harsh Sentencing
Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2013), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/
25/once-again-california-eases-harsh-sentencing-laws. On the day that Gov. Brown
signed S.B. 260, the state filed for an extension to the order requiring the Governor to
reduce the state’s prison population. Id. The state cited SB 260, along with two other
laws, “as ‘historic reforms’ that show California is serious about fixing its criminal
justice system once and for all.” Id.
377 Editorial, California’s Continuing Prison Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/opinion/sunday/californias-continuing-prison-
crisis.html (describing the overwhelming support for restricting the use of three strikes
laws in 2012). “It wasn’t just about saving money; exit polls showed that nearly three-
quarters of those who supported the proposition said they felt the law was too harsh.” Id.
378 See Klingele, supra note 373, at 452-53 (noting that in the early release context
laws must be transparent and “rely on explicitly-stated criteria that the public deems fair”).
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Policies allowing for offender release when their sentences
permit longer commitments have suffered for a variety of reasons,
one of which is a lack of theoretical justification.379 Graham and
Miller focus on the redemptive qualities of youth and possibility
for rehabilitation, providing underpinnings of a sound theoretical
basis for reform.380 But the decisions are not self-actualizing. For
successful implementation, states should be overt in incorporating
that reasoning into new laws and decisions.
CONCLUSION
Implementation of Graham and Miller requires states to
wisely consider the assignment of the decision maker, to provide
clear guidance through release criteria, and to provide
accompanying procedural rights to ensure faithfulness to those
criteria. The role of actuarial risk assessment tools will inevitably
increase as criminal justice decision making incorporates those
instruments. Their role, if properly implemented, may increase
not only the quality of release decision making but also the
perceived legitimacy of decision making by the public.381 But they
work best in tandem with procedural characteristics that foster
fair and transparent application. Finally, release criteria and
rehabilitation opportunities should be tailored to the population
appropriately. Attention to these factors will better arm the
chosen gatekeeper to make well informed decisions that embrace
public safety while also promoting a process that is both rational
and fair. The true promise of the Supreme Court decisions in
Graham and Miller depends upon how states choose to
implement the Court’s holdings and the underlying principles
that accompany them; upon whether the Supreme Court
ultimately sanctions the choices that legislators and lower courts
make when those choices fall short of the Court’s redemptive
aspirations;382 and upon how broadly the reasoning in Graham
and Miller that children are more capable of change influences
juvenile sentencing reform as a whole.
379 See O’Hear, supra note 8, at 1249-50.
380 “The Court’s rationale in Roper and Graham treats youth as a mitigating
factor and supports a rehabilitative response to juvenile crime.” Kristin Henning,
Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due Process, Autonomy, and
Paternalism in Balance, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 25 (2012).
381 See O’Hear, supra note 8, at 1251 n.21.
382 See Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida
and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 86, 92 (2010) (“Graham’s most significant role may be in its recognition of
redemption as an Eighth Amendment constitutional principle, rejecting a legislative
determination that entire classes of individuals were irredeemable.”).
